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CHAPTER I 
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMY AT THE 
BEGINNING OF THE WAR 
The Spanish American War is usually dismissed with a 
few paragraphs in surveys of United states history.l Its most 
lasting title is that of the "Splendid Little War," an epithet 
which does not seem to have made it a prime subject for his-
torical research. Yet, there are certain phases of the war 
which can be of definite interest to the historian, especially 
if he is interested in discovering more about its aftermath. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the American 
Army's organization for logistical supportz first, as it was 
at the beginning of the war; second, as i t was during the 
operation of Tampa as a port of embarkation: and third, as it 
was following the end of the war. 
Logistics is a term not normally encountered by the 
civilian. Broadly speaking, logistics is that branch of the 
military art which deals with the supply of food and material 
to the a rmed forces, their transportation, their medical care, 
the rep airing of their weapons and equipment, and their housing. 
Students of military affairs generally group logistics with 
personnel, intelligence, and operations as the essential 
functions of an army. 
At the beginning of the Spanish-American War, the United 
States Army was composed of 28,183 officers and enli~ted men. 
This force was scattered throughout the country in small detach-
ments, and the supply system of the Army was organized to deal 
with it on a small-scale basis. 2 
The President of the United States was the commander-in-
chief of all of the armed forces of the nation. His wishes in 
regard to the Army were carried out by his Secretary of War, R. 
A. Alger. The military officer at the top of the Army's organi-
zation was the Commanding General, Nelson Miles. The relation-
ship between these two men was the result of the fact that no 
one had ever specified what the duties and responsibilities of 
their respective offices entailed. This was not a new situation, 
since every secretary and commanding general since the Civil War 
had had to deal with it. However, none of these predecessors 
had succeeded in solving it, despite long and acrimonious de-
bates and numerous jurisdictional wrangles. Both men could, and 
did, issue orders to subordinate commanders, but the staff de-
partments in Washington were not under the control of the 
Commanding General. 
Below the Commanding General were the commanders of the i I ! 
geographical departments. These departments, not to be confused I 
with the staff departments in Washington, controlled all troop 
I 
I units within their boundaries, which usually included several sl.::.ates. 
I ~, orders could be issued by the Secretary of War or by I 
! 
____ ,~_AI!~_,., __ o __ ~~! 
the Commanding General, and they would be transmitted downward i I ! 
! 
through this chain of command until they reached the organiza- I 
tion they were intended for. However, if logistics was involved, i 
, 
the heads of the staff departments, nominally acting for the I 
I Secretary of War, issued directives to their representatives in 
the headquarters of the geographical departments. These indi-
viduals then passed the directives down to commanders of units 
in the field, who had to carry them out. Since the staff de-
partments had a limited number of personnel, the actual work of 
these departments in Army units was accomplished by officers of 
the units as a detail. 
The two chains of command operated independently of each 
other, and thus, inevitably, confusion arose when orders issued 
through one chain were found to be in conflict with orders is-
sued through the other. The Commanding General, not unreason-
ably, felt that he should command all of the Army, including the 
staff departments. The Secretary, on the other hand, was the 
head of the Army, and therefore, he felt that all of the depart-
ments, both staff and geographical, and the Commanding General 
should take orders from him. 
The net effect of the situation was that every time a 
conflicting situation arose, it had to be dealt with individual-
ly, with a consequent delay, to say nothing of arguments as to 
who was right, and who had had the authority to issue the order. 
This situation had continued, with varying amounts of trouble, 
from the end of the Civil War to the beginning of the Spanish-
I 
I 
I 
t 
I 
__________________________ ~__ ~ _____ -_.M __________ ~£.'~ ____ fl. _____ .. ____ ~~J 
American War. 
people who were responsible for getting logistical tasks accom-
plished. They usually operated independently, with cases of 
overlapping or disputed functions being handled by an exchange 
of views by mail. The capacities for delay in such a system are 
obvious, but in the peacetime Army, time was not really that im-
portant. 
The officers assigned to staff departments wer~ not only 
operating with little knowledge of the other staff departments. 
They did not really have much idea of what was going on in the 
field, since staff assignments were permanent, and once en-
sconced in Washington, few officers went out to field units. 
The communications necessary for the conduct of normal business 
were by mail, and the Washington staff officers dealt with their 
counterparts in the headquarters of the geographical departments. 
The staff officers in the geographical departments were also 
permanently assigned, which was not too bad because the head-
quarters were usually located in major cities like Chicago or 
st. Louis, and like their fellows in Washington, these officers 
rarely went out to visit field units. Most of the time, busi-
ness could be handled by mail or telegraph, although upon occa-
sion, a maj or concentration of troops at some point in the de-
partrnent might cause one or more staff officers to be reassigned 
to the point of concentration for a period of time, to adminis-
ter the work of his staff depar'tinent. 
, 
I 
I 
~-----------------------------------------.~-~~-- ~~~
:--_______________ __ ~~ ~. ......... .... '.81I&1'!i#_ .. ~"IO=:,.,.?!":.~"";_~_.'~"""10"~~, ... ':':Cn;:. "·,··- ·' ~ 
~ 
In defense of these staff officers, it must be added i 
that the scope of their activities was indeed vast , covering a I 
variety of activities that a modern army staff would subdivide I 
~ 
among many more men. For example, the Quartermaster's Depart-
ment had the following duties: 
• • • to provide the Army with military stores and 
supplies requisite for its use, such as clothing 
and equipage, tents, band instruments, tableware and 
mess furniture, equipment for bakeries, fuel, forage, 
stationery, lumber, straw for bedding of men and 
animals, all materials for camp and for shelter of 
troops and stores, furniture for barracks, heating 
and cooking stoves for use in barracks, tools for 
mechanics and laborers in Quartermaster's Department, 
furniture, books, etc., for post schools, reading 
matter for post libraries, wagons, ambulances, carts, 
saddles, harnesses, water supply, sewerage, plumbing, 
illuminating supplies and heating for all military 
posts and buildings. 
The Department is also charged with the duty of 
transporting by land and water; troops, munitions of 
war, equipments, and all articles of military sup-
plies from the place of purchase to the several armies, 
garrisons, posts and recruiting places. 
It also supplies quartermaster's stores, clothing 
and equipages to the militia of the states and 
Territories, furnishinq transportation therefor, as 
well as for ordnance and ordnance stores issued by the 
general Government to states and Territories. 
It prepares the plans and constructs the barracks, 
quarters, storehouses, hospitals, etc., builds the 
wharves, constructs the roads, builds bridges at 
military posts, provides, by hire or purchase, grounds 
for military encampments and buildings, contracts for 
all horses for cavalry, artillery, Indian scouts, etc., 
and pays all incidental expenses of the mi lita±,y ser-
vice which are not provided by other branches. 3 
The SUbsistence Department, while not bearing a load as 
large as the Quartermaster1s Department, still had an important 
group of duties, namely: i 
• • • the purchasing, issuing, and preservation of I 
subsistence supplies: also the distribution, selling, .. 
and accountability therefor. 4 ~_______ ____~ _______ J 
~ 
The Medical Department's duties, as may well be surmised,i 
dealt with the physical welfare of the troops. The duties were: 
• • • the duty of investigating the sanitary condition 
of the Army, and making recommendations in .reference 
thereto, with the duty of caring for the sick and 
wounded, making physical examinations of officers and 
enlisted men, and furnishing all medical and hospital 
supplies, except for public animals. 5 
The Ordnance Department was responsible for: 
• • • procuring, by purchase or manufacture, and 
distributing the necessary ordnance and ordnance 
supplies for the Government, and the establishment 
and maintenance of arsenals and depots for their manu-
facture and safekeeping. 6 
From the above listing of functions it is easy to sur-
mise that the Army certainly had a good idea of what it had to 
accomplish, and should, therefore, have been ready to do so. In 
fact, though the lists of duties were long, the numbers of per-
sonnel available to accomplish the jobs were few. For example, 
the Quartermaster's Department had a total strength of fifty-
seven officers at the outbreak of war. 7 ~1 the credit side, it 
must be said that these officers did have experience in arrang-
ing rail movements of bodies of troops, but the lack of experi-
ence in purchasirlg, contracting, and handling large quantities 
of material more than offset this slight advantage. The other 
staff departments were in little better shape. The Commissary-
General of SUbsistence had 
••• only 22 officers , viz., the Commissary-General, 
2 colonels, 3 lieutenant colonels, 8 majors and 8 
captains.8 
The Medical Department had " ••• 124 medical officers, United 
_----------------A.~ .... ,O:-*-..... otki!Sii! .. C.... U1«.~r:. 'I. l':l!'; .. .,Fo!.~~,.. ' .• "1:t ~.,,--~.,....,( .. ' 
r states Army, and 60 contract surgeons on duty in the field. n9 
The Ordnance Department had the following amount avail-
able I 
• • • 1 Brigadier-General, 3 Colonels, 4 Lieutenant 
Colonels, 10 Majors, 22 captains, 14 First Lieutenants, 
1 Ordnance storekeeper with rank of Major and 1 Ord-
nance storekeeper with rank of captain • • .10 I 
The Army had no one charged with the responsibility of I 
planning for war. The staff departments were occupied completely I 
with the conduct of day to day business, and the Secretary and 
Commanding General had to worry about the business, too. The 
advent of war was, if anything, a remote possibility. When it 
came, the logisticians had to improvise to meet rapidly changing 
conditions. 
CHAPTER II 
PLANNING FOR MOBILIZATION AND 
SHIPMENT OF TROOPS 
President McKinley conferred on March 6 with the chair-
man of the House Appropriations Conunittee, Mr. Cannon, on the 
subject of money for the war. McKinley told Cannon, " ••• I 
must have money to get ready for war. I am doing everything 
possible to prevent war, but it must come and we are not prepared 
for war. Who knows where this war will lead us; it may be more 
than a war with Spain. How can I get the money for these extra-
ordinary expenditures?"l McKinley's worries as to how the funds 
were to be obtained were unfounded, for, on l<1arch 9, both Houses 
passed an appropriation of fifty million dollars for national 
defense by unanimous votes. 
With I Having gotten the funds, it was now the task of the President to apportion it B.nd give directions for its use. 
such a large amount to use, results could be expected. Amazing-
1y, few results were forthcoming. One writer comments as fol-
lows: 
Under the appropriation made on March 9, 1898 of 
$50,000,000 for 'national defense', much had been done 
in preparation by the ordinance and engineer and signa1-
service departments, to which ten, five and a half and 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
I 
~--------------------------------------------~--------------.~-----=----"~ 
t"r----o-n-e-.---Q-u-a-r-t-e-r-rn-,-i-l ... l-i-o-,n-s-1-1-a-d-b-e-.e-n--a-l""'l-o-t-t-e-·d-, ~i-n-·--~-~-~""--"'o-r::~-·-I 
named. The quartermaster, commissary, and medical de- i 
partments, up to April 23, by what would appear a 1 
singular interpretation on the part of President I 
McKinley and his advisors, had ~ot been allowed to go • 
outside their ordinary routine. i 
The division of funds mentioned is very interesting, With! 
three of the most important branches, logistically speaking, I 
gi ven nothing additional \;1i th which to prepa.re for war. It is a i 
measure of the logistical ignorance of the period, when items II 
like clothing, food and medicine were not provided for. As a , 
matter of fact, the three departments mentioned as receiving 
funds were equally limited since the funds were specifically 
limited to expenditures for coast defense. Secretary of War, 
R. A. Alger, points this out, saying, "Allotments were therefore 
made, out of the $50,000,000 fund to the Ordnance, Engineer, 
Quartermaster, Medical and Signal Corps, as follows: Ordnance 
[about] $10,000,000; Engineer, $5,500,000; Quartermaster, 
$500,000; Medical, $20,000i Signal, $226,400. All of this was 
for purposes of coast defense ••• 3. The Ordnance, Engineers, 
and Signal Corps had a great deal of work to do with the coastal I 
defenses, but, tI ••• the Quartermaster, Commissary, and Medical ~ i i 
Departments, up to Apri l 23rd, had been denied even the privi- I 
lege of endeavor. Not one of these, unce r the President' sinter-I 
pretation of the term 'national defense (' had been permitted to I 
I 
I 
! 
! 
take a step outside the ordinary routine; they could not either 
procure or order anything in the way of equir:'ment. • Be-
cause of this, absolutely nothing had been added to the ordinary I 
~ "","_>~J 
supply as it existed Harch 9, 1898. ,, 4 
Later on, we will look further at the results of this 
limitation, but at this time it is important for us to consider 
what 'VIas done by the Army, specifically the offices of the 
Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General, to prepare for 
the mobilization and shipment of the Army. The Adjutant-General 
was responsible for mobilization. On April 15, 1898, a letter 
was sent to the commanding generals of all departments ordering 
the concentration of Re~ular Army troups from their departments 
5 
at a number of camps and coast defense installations. At the 
same time, a letter was directed to his subordinates by the 
Adjutant-General instructing them to sand telegraphic orders to 
Major General Brooke, and Brigadier-Generals Shafter, Coppinger, 
and Wade to establish camps at Chickamauga Park, Georgia, New 
Orleans, Louisiana, Mobile, Alabama, and Tampa, Florida. The 
generals were directed to send their chief quartermasters ahead 
to select camp grounds for the troops ordered to assemble at 
6 these places. Orders were also sent releasing officers from 
their assignments at infantry and cavalry schools and returning 
them to their reg im£mt 5 • 7 ! , 
The order of April 15 directed the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, I! 
I 
I Ninth, Thirteenth, Seventeenth, and Twenty-First Regiments of 
I Infantry to assemble at Tampa, where Brigadier-General William Shafter commanded. The Regular Army was being prepared for war. 
I 
I ~ The voluntec~rs were not summoned to the colors until the Presi-dents's call for 125,000 men on April 23, 1898. In the interest 
of maintaining continuity, the movement of the Regulars to their 
mobilization stations \4ill be examined. Obviously I the Adjutant-
General's office had prepared for the issuing of the orders, and 
the amount of men to be moved, while unusual, was not outside 
the capabilities of the Quartermaster's Department. Both of 
these departments had moved units of the Regular Army from place 
to place during peacetime for annual firing exercises, parades, 
and other activities. Now these units were being moved to mo-
bilization stations, but the mechanics of movement remained the 
same. 
The Fourth Infantry was stationed at Fort Sheridan, 
Illinois. On April 19, 1898, it moved from this station to 
Tampa, Florida. The U. S. Government had it contract with the 
Pennsylvania Railroad to move the regiment. Thirty-one officers 
and 475 enlisted men participated in the movement. The total 
cost to the government for troop movement into Tampa ,."as 
$9,452.08, or $18.68 per man. The regiment also brought three 
carloads of baggage, which were charged at the rate of $146.00 
each, or a total of $438.00. 8 
Also moving to Tampa was the Fifth U. S. Infantry! but 
they were diverted to Pensacola, Florida, and Fort ~1cPherson and 
Tybee Island, Georgia, from which they eventually reached th(~ir 
destination in July.9 
The Sixth U. S. Infantry came from Fort Thomas, Georgia 
on April 19, via the Louisville an! Nashville Railroad. Tlw 
526 officers and men of this unit cost $10,919.76 to move, an 
average of $20.76 per man. In additi.on, the unit brought three 
carloads of baggage, two of which were sent at the rate of $131 
apiece, with the third costing $184, for a total of $446. 10 
The Ninth Infantry Regiment came from Madison Barracks, 
New York, on the W & A Railroad. Like the other regiments, they 
moved on April 19, but their movement costs "Jere apparently a 
little higher. The trip cost $27.72 a man, or $12,994.72 for 
the 476 individuals who made up the unit. While this was a lit-
tle higher rate, the real difference in costs is found in the 
ch.arges for the regiments baggage. Each of fonr cars was charged 
$319.15, for a total of $1,276.00. Regrettably, the Army re-
cords of this movement do not reveal what the cause for this 
high charge was. l1 
Also paying a higher charge for movement was the Thir-
teenth U. S. Infantry, "'hich carne from Buffalo. The rate per 
man was $26.35, for a regimental total of $10,065.70, a not un-
reasonable amount in comparison with the amount per man paid by 
the Ninth. The baggaqe difference is worthy of note, with the 
three cars of impedimenta being charged at the rate of $223.00, 
a total of $669.00. This is a difference of $96.15 in baggage 
rate, as opposed to a difference in the individual rate of only 
$1.37. 12 
The Seventeenth U. S. Infantry moved from Columbus 
Barracks, Ohio by the Pennsylvania Railroad. The 511 men of 
this unit went at the rate of $18.33 each, or $9,366.63 for the 
whole regiment. Like the Sixth, the unit's baggage was charged 
at different rates, one carload going for $172.00, while the 
other three cost only $129.00, for a total of $559.00 for regi-
mental baggage. 13 
The final unit ordered to Tampa by the War Department 
order of April 15 was the Twenty-First Infantry. which was in 
Plattsburg, New York. It moved on the W & A Line, a total of 
476 men for a total fare of $12,937.68. The four carloads of 
regimental baggage went at the rate of $319.15, the same amount 
it cost the Ninth Infantry, and there was only $.54 difference 
in the individual rate between the two regiments. The total 
cost of regimental baggage movement was $1,276.60. 14 
Taken individually, the above statistics have interest 
for the scholar, since they reflect the rates current for per-
sons and baggage at the time. Of far more importance, however, 
is the information which can be derived from a study of the sta-
tistics for all of these regiments. 
The first item which can be deduced from the statistics 
is an estimate of the capability of the ave rage Regular Army 
regiment to move upon short notice. The order for movement was 
issued on April 15, and each of the units we have mentioned 
moved on April 19th. This gives us a figure of four days for 
packing and movement for a unit of between four and five hundred 
men. A good part of this time was undoubtedly spent in packing 
and loading all of the items of unit impedimenta, which l eads us 
to another point about which we may make deductions. Ea c .t1 of 
units had either three or four carloads of this baggage, which 
may be thus accepted as average figures for typical units of this } 
size. Later on, when other units arc moved into Tampa, we will 
have an opportunity to see whether this figure holds up for Reg-
ular troops, and how it compares with the amounts brought by the 
Volunteers. 
We may also deduce from the bare facts of this movement 
that these regiments were in a good state of training. A cer-
tain amount of discipline is required for a unit movement, and a 
poorly trained or untrained unit shows a lack of this discipline 
when moving. 
The lack of movement discipline is reflected in comments 
of both railroad officials and technical service officers. Re-
marks such as "a lot of rough fellows" and "abused our coaches·' 
came from the railroads. lS 
The next item which may be inferred from the statistics 
is that the chief quartermasters who negotiated with the rail-
roads did a fairly consistent job. The rates for each movement 
vary but little for the individuals, and the two occasions where 
rates for baggage seem high are both on units moving from New 
York State, and on the same railroad, the W & A. 
Thus far, we have discussed only the units of the Regular 
Anny, covering them through their mobilization and movement to 
Tampa. Just three days after the units we have discussed moved 
to Tampa, the President issued a call for 125,000 men. Let us 
now turn to a discussion of the mobilization procedures used for 
handling these 125,000, and then, to a discussion of their 
movement to Tampa. 
The Adjutant-Ceneral was the individual department head 
with the responsibility for transforming the President's call 
into a concrete system, and placing that system into operation. 
Let us let him tell us how this was done, in the words he used 
to tell a Congressional Committee: 
Question: ••• on April 23, the President issued a pro-
clamation calling for 100,000 (sic] volunteers. Then 
what did the War Department do? 
Answer: It took all the steps necessary to carry the 
order into immedia.te effect. ~le apportioned the number 
of troops that were to be furnished by each State, and 
mustering officers were duly appointed and rendezvous 
selected, and these officers were mustering in men as 
fast as the16coulc1 be e>:amined. I think we were about forty days. 
In the course of the mustering-in process, the State 
Militia underwent a change. When the officers and men were 
sworn in, they became part of the Federal Force, the Volunteer 
Army as it was called. 
As it had done so many times in the past, the system of 
State Militia again created a problem. Since the State gover-
nors had the power to appoint the officers of this militia, 
would they allow the President to have this power, which would 
seem to be necessary if the units became part of a federal 
force? Also would units going into the active federal service be 
required to change their unit designations? Such a move would 
offend the members of this militia, who cherished the history of 
their units, many of which had existed continuously since the 
Revolution. Yet, considerable confusion could be expected in an 
army which had a second regiment of infantry, and, for example, 
a Second Massachusetts or a Second Illinois. Orders could be 
missent, and people confused by a number of different units with 
similar designations. 
The l'lar Department had recognized the existence of both 
of these problems, and had held a number of conferences attempt-
ing to solve them. The memory of the performance of state mili-
tia units in the Civil War was still strong and the War Depart-
ment did not want repetition of such performance. The Department 
drafted a bill to be presented to Congress which might solve the 
problems. It would set up a federal force, with officers ap-
pointed by the President, since the force was for service out-
side the borders of the states. The force was to be composed of 
volunteers, but would not be called a volunteer army. 
However, the War Department was dealing with political 
forces, and before the bill was even sent to Congress, it had 
agreed to take any militia regiment into active service, if it 
was at full strength. It had also agreed not to allow appoint-
ment of any "West-Pointers" to this volunteer force. The mili-
tia regiments had a long tradition of appointing their own of-
ficers, and would not be likely to allow any of the graduates of 
the military academy to usurp their privileges, to say nothing 
of introducing Regular Army ideas of discipline and training 
into the militia. The bill was finally passed, but with the pro-
vision that militia regiments could be received directly into 
the active service if at full strength, and that all officers 
would be appointed by the President only upon the recommend:~~~-I 
of the state governors. 17 
The whole problem of appointment of officers has rela-
tion to logistics primarily because of the fact that many of the 
appointments later were proved to be unwise by the performance 
of the men. In particular, there were appointments of men as 
quartermasters of units, and resultant confusion because of lack 
of experience, ignorance or inefficiency. 
Thus the forces which were to fight the l~ar of 1898 as-
surned their character. The militia, in whatever state of train-
ing and equipment, was to be taken in, and subjected to a mini-
f R 1 A . fl 18 Uh b h 1 1 mum 0 egu ar rmy ~n uence. ty at a out t e actua meC1an-
ics of induction or '.'mustering-in?" How was this force assem-
bled and shipped? 
The answer of the Adjutant-General to the Congressional 
committee which we have quoted above gives only the bare out-
lines. Upon receiving their allotment of units, each state se-
lected the units which it desired to send. This selection in 
itself had a distinctly political character, for the party in 
power at the State Capitol made the selections with the idea 
that they would eventually reap some political benefit from the 
future war heroes. Thus, it is no surprise that Nebraska ap-
pointed William Jennings Dryan a colonel of militia. 
Having selected the units, the states directed their as-
sembly at a designated rendezvous, usually the State Capitol. 
At this point, physical examinations were given, and if the men 
I 
passed, they were mustered into the federal service. During the 
period of rendezvous, the volunteers enjoyed the adulation bf the 
local populace, and many parades were staged for local digni-
taries. Little in the way of training or equipping the units 
was done, because it was assumed that a militia unit needed lit-
tIe training beyond what it had, and, of course, the federal gov-
ernment would provide any equipment necessary. 
The question of equipment was to provide a real problem 
for the War Department, since the volunteers were found to be in 
all stages of equipment and dress when they were mustered in. 
But little could be done in the mustering camp, "lith friends, 
sweethearts, and families looking on. So the mili tia \~ere moved 
out to a place where they could absorb some of the influence of 
the Regular Army. In addition, having the large mass of men to-
gether would simplify the logistics, since large quantities 
could be shipped to one point for issue. 
The Quartermaster General \iaS the staff officer responsi-
ble for movement of these units, as he had been for the movement 
of the Regulars. His testimony before a Congressional Committee, 
like that of the Adjutant-Ceneral, shows the outlines of what 
was done. 
On May 8, in anticipation of the movement of the volunteer 
forces of the country to field duty, the Quartermaster-
General prepared lists of those to be shipped from each 
locality and sent them to the officers of the Quarter-
master's Department who would be charged with the trans-
portation. The following is a copy of the letter as send 
out: 
Sir: The tvar Department has informed the Quarterrnaster-
1I"""'"' _______________________ ~~~:9t~-~.lIII'-~~'~:1 
, 
General that as soon as mustered in and equipped at the I 
several points of rendezvous in the states referred to, 
the volunteer forces of the United States mentioned on 
the enclosed statement will be sent to the national camps 
and points of defense and reserve .s indicated thereon. 
You will examine the list with a view of determining 
the requirements for the transportation of the troops from 
the states embraced in the Department • • • to points of 
destination when their movement is ordered. 
After familiarizing yourself with the necessary detail 
of this subject, you will consult the railroads interested 
in the transportation of these troops, and determine, as 
far as practicable, such preliminaries as can be settled 
in advance of the movement. 
The exact number of troops to come with each organiza-
tion is not known to this office, but will be communicated 
to you as soon as the information is obtained. It is 
thought, however, that the necessary routes of travel can 
be definitely fixed, and such competition invited as will 
secure the most advantageous rates for each movement, so 
that when instructions are communicated to you to have the 
troops go forward there will be nothing to delay their 
prompt shipment. 
It is suggested, to avoid crowding, where troops are 
to go out overnight a double seat be given each man. 
The subject is therefore committed to your discretion, 
with the request that you will take all the preliminary 
steps deemed by you advisable, and keep the OUartermaster-
General informed of the more important features of the 
matter. 
Respectfully, 
M.I. Ludington 
Quartermaster-General of the u.s. 19 
It will be seen from the above statement that the 
Quartermaster-General had made preparations, and directed his 
subordinates to make as detailed preparations as were possible 
under the circumstances. How would the Quartermaster-General's 
subordinates be made aware of the impending movements? The 
Quartermaster-General had written to the Adjutant-General on this 
subject. 
• • • if the Adjutant-General will give this office imme-
diate notice when advised that any troops are ready to be 
transported to the field, with the name of the proper 
officer to address relative to their transportation, the 
Quartermaster-General will at once notify such officer by 
wire the address of the proper officer of the Quarter-
master's Department to whom to apply for transportation, 
and at the same time the quartermaster will be instructed 
by wire to supply the required transportation with the 
least possible delay. 
If this proposed line of action ia strictly carried 
out, it i8 thought that the volunteer troops will be placed ~ 
in the field at the leaat possible cost to the united states 
and with the least practicable delay to the military ser-
vice. 
Respectfully, 
M. I. Ludington 20 Quartermaster-General of the U.S. 
On the surface, it would appear that the staff depart-
ments had planned well, and had made arrangements for the move-
ments in advance of the time they were to be made. In addition, 
the movement of the Regular Army had been carried out success-
fully, which would seem to presage similar success for the v01un-
teers. The only difference was one of degree. 
In addition to the 125,000 vclunt~~rs requested by 
McKinley on April 23, he requested 75,000 volunteers on May 25, 
which made the Army re.ponsible for the transportation of 200,000 
meno 21 The difference in degree was tenfold, and although the 
AnMY had planned to handle the movements, there were just not 
enough men in the OUartenMaster's Department to personally super-
vise each movement. This had an effect on the efficiency of the 
operation, since there waa usually no individual well-infonMed 
on the contract detaila to insure their enforcement at the time 
of movement. This problem was not so great with the Regulars 
who were used to moving, and aware of their entitlements. 
In addition to the problem of having too few qualified 
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men to aid in directing the movement, the Quartermaster-General's l 
I 
office had to also come to the realization that the movement of 
200,000 men represented a considerable demand on the railroad 
system of the united States. 
This railroad deficiency constituted a problem over which 
the Army had no control. Although plans had been made for the 
shipment of the volunteer units when they were ready, the rail-
roads stood as a stumbling block to the fulfillment of these 
plans. 22 
Pressure was developing on the War Department to do some-
thing about an invasion of CUba. General Miles had recommended 
that no invasion be made until after the rainy season, so that 
the Army could be better trained in large-scale operations, and 
so that the danger of disease would be lessened. But President 
McXinley seemed to have little regard for the possibility of such 
problems. Early in May, he had told the Army to take 70,000 men 
and capture Havana, without trying to find out whether the Army 
could muster such a number. In fact, the Volunteers were still 
being shipped into Chickamauga, and the Regulars into Tampa, 
during the end of May.23 
units of the Regular Army had been detached from their 
original points of concentration beginning in April, and ordered 
to move to Tampa. The 9th cavalry was sent from Chickamauga on 
the N.C. and st. L. Railroad, as was the 24th Infantry. The 1st 
Infantry was moved from New Orleans, and the 2nd, 7th, 8th, 12th'J' 
16th, 22d and 25th Infantry from their points of concentration. 
By May 25th, General Shafter, commanding at Tampa, could report 
to the War Department that he had five regiments of Regular 
cavalry, sixteen regiments of Regular Infantry, ten batteries of 
light artillery, two companies of engineers, a signal detachment 
and four batteries of heavy artillery. This force of about 
25,000 men represented almost all of the Regular Army. 24 
By the time that General Shafter submitted his report, 
units of the Volunteer Army were beginning to arri.ve at Tampa .• 
As of the date of his report, there were ten regiments of vJ lun-
teers assigned to Shafter's Fifth Corps. Seven of the regiments 
were at Tampa, having been moved there directly from their points 
of mustering-in. These were the Seventy-First New York, the 
Second Massachusetts, the Third and Fifth Ohio, the Second 
Georgia, the Thirty-Second Michigan and the Second Wisconsin. 
The problem of water supply was the reason the other 
three regiments were not at Tampa. General Shafter outlined his 
problena and actions in a telegram to the COmmanding General. 
On account of difficulty in finding suitable camp ground 
with abundant water supply, I have temporarily stopped 
part of the volunteer regiments at Jacksonville and placed 
thaD under command of General Lawton. The Government will 
not be subjected to extra expense on account of the trans-
portation nor for supply depots or officer. They will be 
brought closer to Tampa as soon as possible. The principal 
difficulty here i. water, which must be drawn from wells. 
Surface wells cannot be used. 25 
The three regiment. at Jacksonville were the Second 
Illinois, First North carolina, and Fifth Iowa. 26 All three 
received orders diverting them from their original destination 
while en route. The Second Illinois was the first unit to arrive 
at Jacksonville, having received its orders on the same day the 
telegram was sent from Shafter to Milea. It was followed the 
next day by the First North carolina, and a few days later by 
the Fifth Iowa. 
The shipment of troops waa an immediate problem which 
had to be faced by the Army. The planning of the Quartermaster's 
Department had to be comprehensive enough to cover movements of 
both Regular and Volunteer units. Plans made by the quarter-
masters of geographical departments were quite specific in de-
tails of accommodations, and when it was possible, in destina-
tion. The Q.lartermaster of the Department of the Lakes issued a 
public notice inviting sealed bids from the various railroads. 
The bids were to be made for a journey between a specified point 
within the department to a specified mobilization point. The 
notice also required -that after twelve hours' notice required 
equipment will be furnished aa called for by the Quarte~ster's 
Department,- and -that the troops, their horses and freight, will 
be 'run' in solid trains from initial to ultimate point.-27 In 
addition, the notice provided that when troops made a journey of 
longer than one day, each man was to have a double seat. 
The specific purpose of this aection has been to outline 
the actions taken by the ouartermaster's Department during the 
period before the war, and during the period of mobilization and 
shipment to the initial station. 
The second section of the survey on transportation moves 
into an area in which no one in the Army had any experience, that 
of movement by water. The work done in ship chartering, fitting-
out and purchasing was the first ever done in this area by the 
Army, at least within the memory of anyone in the War Department. 
The Ar.my's experience with river steamboats in the west was 
hardly applicable to sea-going vessels. 
In order to place the work of the Army in water trans-
port in its proper perspective, it is necessary to refer to the 
"Fifty Million Bill" for "national defense," and the interpreta-
tion of this piece of legislation by President McRinley and his 
advisors. Under McKinley's interpretation, the Army could make 
no offensive preparations, but the Navy, on the other hand was 
obliged to make all possible preparations for coast defense. 
The Navy Department took advantage of this interpretation, and 
made arrangements to charter most of the available ships, for use 
in the accomplishing of its defense mission. 
The U.S. Army, on the eve of war, had no ships with which 
to move troops, because of the rigid interpretation of McRinley. 
What is worse, there was no mechanism and there were no prece-
dents for handling the movement of troops by water. Placing this 
problem into the time-frame gives it more force. In a period of 
slightly more than forty days, the Army, specifically the office 
of the Quartermaster-General, had to evolve the techniques neces-
sary to charter ships and buy ships, actually acquire the ships 
through charter or purchase, prepare them for military use as 
troop transports or cargo vessels, and get them to the point of 
use. 
The preparations which could be made for war were limited 
to surveys of the market. On March 24# such a survey was ordered 
••• The Quartermaster-General directed the depot quarter-
master in New York to report at once all available vessels 
of the coastline steamship companies that could be obtained 
by charter, and to state their capacity, etc. The reply 
reached him on March 29# furnishing the desired information, 
but adding that a member of the board on auxiliary cruisers 
had stated that the Navy had absolute opti~B on all boats 
of the most prominent steamship companies. 
This survey was to be kept secret by the Depot Quarter-
master, as instructions in the letter ordering the survey indi-
cate. 29 Only American flag ships were to be considered for ser-
vice. 
From the report of the Depot Quartermaster, it would 
appear that no ships were to be had. However, when it became 
known that the Army was actually chartering ships, many offers 
were received. 
When it became known that the Department required vessels 
for Army transport service, tenders of vessels for charter. 
and purchase were received from all the prominent steam-
ship companies, and inspections of the vessels were made 
by officers of the Department, and reported to this office 
with a view to selection of those best suited for the 
service. 30 
Apparently ship owners decided that the chances of profit 
were enough for them to risk their ships, and decided to offer 
them for charter, thus opening up the market. The mention of 
inspections is the first hint of chartering technique. SUch 
inspections would be the responsibility of the officer in charge 
of chartering vessels. Colonel Amos Ktmball, the Depot Quarter-
master at New York, gave the job of inspecting potential charter 
~ ___________________________________________________ ,__ =_u, __________ ~ 
r--------------------------"--~s;r..:or;..·~::,..i"~ ...... ~.-.~;;.~~ -'~ ·1 
ve •• els to hi. a •• istant, Major John W. SUmmerhayes. Major I 
summerhayes described the method of inspectiona 
I went through the vessel and examined her and I had the 
engineers give me a statement as to the condition of her 
boilers and engines, and alao the amount of water she could 
carry, the amount of coal she could carry in her bunkers, 
and iilshe had staving capacity, if she could put on extra 
coal. 
Thus, in addition to inspecting the ship, Major swamer-
hayes got an estimate of her fuel-carrying capacity. However, 
the A~ also had to know how many men every vessel could carry. 
A Navy officer was detailed to aid sw.merhayes in making this 
estimation. The technique used was borrowed from the British, 
and provided that for each ten and a half of carrying capacity, 
one man could be carried. 32 
After inspection, the tenders for charter or purchase 
were forwarded to Washington along with the reports of the inape 
ting officer. 
Oolonel Kimball described the next step, which concluded 
with final approval or rejection of the inspected ships. 
• • • they were examined by Oolonel Hecker, under his 
direction by experts, and then the great bulk of them were 
accepted. The formal contract was made by Oolonel Bird, 
who was on duty in the Quarterma8ter-General's office, he 
being right there, and they being turned right into r8ic] 
him, but the work of detailed inspection, of passing j~ 
the 8hips, was under the direction of Oolonel Hecker. 
Before the reports and tenders were sent directly to 
Colonel Bird. This is significant because all of the transports 
for the Tampa area destined for the Shafter expedition to CUba 
were thu8 excluded from the technical 8crutiny of Colonel Hecker, 
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a civilian shipping expert appointed directly from civil life, I 
and hi •• taff. This technical scrutiny was primarily an analy-
.i. of whether the .hip. could be used a. tran.port •• 
Ships which were accepted for charter would be contrac-
ted for at a daily rate. Colonel Bird was responsible for work- , 
ing out this rate, and .ubmitting it to the Assistant secretary 
of War for his approval. '!'he working out of the rate was done 
in negotiations with the owner. of the ve.sel. Colonel Bird 
worked according to the tonnage of the v •••• l. in trying to .et 
charter fiqures. 
I tried to arrange it by tonnage. We tried to pay 15 
cent. for a gro.s ton ••• for 3,000 tons and over. 
Question a What does 15 cents a gross ton mean? 
Answer. Say a v.ssel i. 3,000 tons, 15 cents would be 
$450 a day. Under that w. tried to arrange for 20 cent. 
a ton, and under 2,000, 25 cents per ton. 
Question a SO far a. you were concerned, then, the price. 
were determined by the Secretary of War after a confer.nce 
with you? 
Answer. Always. 34 
Armed with these figures, and the approval of the Assis-
tant Secretary, Colonel Bird then concluded the negotiations 
and chartered the vessel. 
The rates received after the negotiation. seemed to 
correspond to the guidelin.s the Colonel had mentioned. How-
ever, some of the earlier charters carried a special rate, with 
one amount to be paid daily for the first thirty days, and a 
second, lower rate to be paid for periods over thirty days, if 
the ve.sel was retained in service by the government. Exampl.s 
of this group are the Olivette. chart.red April 30, $500 for 
j 
tered April 29, $625 and $575. Ships chartered later were 
gotten at a single rate, with one exception, the Specialist. 
chartered June 3, with rates of $425 and $375. 35 
Rates for other vessels correspond closely to the ton-
nage rate figures. For example, the Slratoga and Seneca. of 
1,943 and 1,939 tons respectively, went at the rate of $450 
daily, actually lower than the rate of 25 cents a ton which was 
given for thoae ships below 2,000 tons. The Segur,nca, of 2,806 
tons, and the Vi9ilancil' of 2,934 tons, carried the rate of 
$600 daily. This rate was slightly higher than the 20 cents a 
ton for ships between 2,000 and 3,000 tons, but not as high as 
the 25 cents for ships below 2,000 tons. 
SOme variance i. found in earlier figures, which would 
indicate that, at least in the beginning, there was .ame hesi-
tancy about the amount to be paid for a charter. The Olivette. 
which we have already mentioned, had a rate amounting to over 
30 cents a ton for the first thirty days. However, as time 
went on, experience must have been gained, for we find that ten 
days after chartering the Olivette. the Department got a ship of 
half again the size, the Orizabl. for the same amount. 36 
Included in the charter rate were master and crew, and 
acceptance of all marine risk by the owners. This meant that if 
the ship were damaged while under charter, the Army would not be 
liable. i'he """ere 18ad. 80IIle attempt. to get th: ~~ ~J 
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take the marine risk. but were not successful. The Army had to I 
provide provisions and fuel, and make its own modifications to 
the interior of the ships. 
In the case of ships offered to the government of pur-
chase, Colonel Hecker was the principal operator. He described 
the procedure for the Dodge Commission. 
Qu.etiona Did you have any hand in the purchase of vessels 
An8Wera Yes, sir. Questiona Haw many did you purchase, and when? 
Anaver a Seventeen in all. 
Question: Between what dates? 
Answer a Between the 25th of JUne and about the same date 
in 3Uly, about thirty daye. 
Queetiona In the purchase of these • • • vesse18, Colonel, 
as I understand it you were acting with the engineer, the 
consulting engineer who was in the employ of the Depart-
ment. 
Answer a Yes, air. Question I Did you _ploy any intermediary agents or did 
you deal directly with the owners of the vessels? 
Answer: We dealt directly with the owners of these ves-
sels, or with the parties who represented the owners when 
we could not get at the owners. Question: • • • In purchasing these vessels, did you fix 
the value in view of the demand which was made for them, 
or upon their intrinsic value? 
Answers Largely based on their intrinsic value as c~uted 
by Mr. Rirby [the Department's consulting engineer].37 
Colonel Hecker had begun negotiations for some of the 
ships eventually purchased during the months of May and JUne, 
before accepting his Army commission. However, the deals were 
not consummated until the period noted above. 
After value had been computed, negotiations were car-
ried out, a price fixed, and the contract executed. The use of 
technical experts was a large factor in the success of the gov-
ernment in acquiring vessels for use. HOwever, the vessels used 
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at Tampa were not purchased but chartered. The purchased ves- I 
I sels were not used until after the expedition to Cuba had left. t 
How many ships were actually obtained through charter 
and purchase? The Dodge Commission gave the following figures 
in its report to the President. 
The testimony before the OommissiQn shows that between 
April 1 and August 31, 44 steamships were chartered and 
14 purchased for service in the Atlantic and Gulf waters; 
• • • and that all were fitted up to a certain extent, 38 
for the transportation of troops, animals and supplies. 
Of this group, thirty-eight were sent to Tampa to move 
the Fifth Corps to Cuba. 
The ships that had been obtained were cargo vessels, and 
considerable modification would be necessary before they could 
be used to carry troops. These modific&tions were a source of 
trouble, particularly in the first group of vessels chartered. 
Major Summerhayes was put in charge of this phase of the opera-
tion. Later, in response to a question from a member of the 
Dodge Commission, he said that the first group of ships char-
tered were not suitable for troop ships. His reason was that 
I 
they were too small. 3S Size aside, modifications in ventilation I 
and sanitary facilities would be necessary for troop or animal 
cargoes. 
I 
I 
I 
The Major described the procedure followed in making the I 
modifications and preparing the ships for movement. 
• • • the first vessels that went out we had so short a 
time to fit them out, we could not put in the standee 
bunks • • ., we had not the canvas in the first place, 
and in the second place we had not the skilled workmen. 
They were built out of wood. They were put in clusters 
,[ 
I 
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I 
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of 12, three berth. high and a long space between them 
of about 2 feet between each clu.ter on the sides and 
ends. Question I Having put the bunk. in, what was the next 
step? 
Answer: I had four or five days to fix up the ship, work-
ing night and day, after that, toilets were put in. 
Wherever we could find the space for cooking - the only 
chance the men had to cook on the.e ships was during 
night - they all went with travel ration, and the only 
cooking ab.olutely necessary was cooking coffee, and they 
did that at night. Those were the first transports.40 
The techniques for fitting out became lDOre sophisticated 
as time went on, and particularly after the immediate n.ed for 
traneports for Tampa had been fill.d. Th. initial period was 
a time of rushing to get the .hips pr.pared, while the people 
who were working on the shipe were learning the technique. of 
preparing them. Por example, Major SUl1IDlerhaye. pointed out to 
a member of the Dodge Coamd.sion who a.ked why the ships .ent 
to Tampa did not have forced draft ventilation systems. 
General, I was g.tting an order. under.tand these .hips 
had to go at once. I would have anywhere from. three to 
five day. to take a ship and fit her up to go to sea. 
We put 100 men on, working night and day. It was a ru.h 
order.4l 
Actually, the que.tion of forced draft ventilation did 
not come up until the troop. at Tampa had been on board the 
v •••• le for almost a week. General Mil.. telegraphed the 
Quart.rma.t.r-General on June 14 and directed him to have forced 
draft ventilation installed on all future vessels.42 
The problem of trying to fit out the ve ••• ls in a race 
against tim. ie illustrated by three example.. The first con-
cerned the purchase of ship's stores and food for the crew •• 
Charles L. SWift, the surveyor for the fleet, was asked why 
competitive bids were not requested for the supplies. He re-
plied, ~e could not very well do that when I got an order 
tonight [sic] to furnish a ship tomorrow.43 He told the commis-
sion that this had happened several times. 
The second example involves Major Summerhayes' assis-
tant during the fi tting-out period, Henry P. Kirkham. When 
asked by the Dodge Commission if the transports sent out could 
have been made better, he replied that they could have been mad, ' 
better, but said, ·~ere waa not time • • • sometimes I would 
be all night long at the yard • • • and then the men had to be 
on hand all times, nights and Sundays ... 44 
The third example shows the kind of orders received by 
SUmmerhayes. In a telegram sent to Summerhayes, the Quarter-
master-General says, "The following ves.els chartered to sail 
immediately [emphasis mine] to Key W.at, .. 45 and follows this 
directive with a list of twelve ships. The charters had been 
made on May 10 and 11, and the list of ships ¥as received by 
SUmmerhayes May 11. Given the rate of three to five days per 
ship, Summerhayes mentioned in his testimony, thes. twelve ships 
should not have been rea~~ before JUne 14 at the earliest. As 
a matter of fact, some of the ships mentioned in the Quarter-
master-Generales telegram were at Tampa in time for loading on 
..rune 7. SUmmerhayes had done his job well, and finiahed it on 
time. The problema which aroae about the ships later were 
either those which were not foreseen in time, like the forced 
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draft ventilation, or those about which nothing could be done, 
like the problem of capacity. 
This chapter has covered mobilization techniques for 
Regular and Volunteer unita, and movement methods by land and 
water. The general conclusions to be drawn from the examination 
are theae: first, that the Adjutant-General's Department was 
well prepared to handle the mobilization of both Regulars and 
Volunteers, and carried out this mobilization efficiently, 
second, that the OUartermaster-General's Department was well-
prepared to handle rail movements on the basis of prior experi-
ence in this field, established techniques for dealing with the 
carriers, and sufficient time to handle the volume of traffic 
without confusion, and third, that the Quartermaster-General's 
Department was limited in its ability to procure and prepare 
ships by a lack of funds during the period immediately before 
the outbreak of war, by a lack of experience in ship chartering, 
purchasing and preparation, and by a lack of time in Which to 
evolve techniques and get the neeesaary preparations made. A 
further conclusion concerning the Quartermaster-General's Depart-
ment is that the Department spared no effort in preparing the 
ships for movement in the time allotted. 
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CHAPTER III 
PLANNING FOR SUPPLY AND HOUSING 
OF TROOPS 
The functions of supply were divided among a number of 
technical service departments. The Quartermaster-General, 
SUrgeon-General, Chief of Ordnance and COmmissary-General of 
subsistence each had a part in supplying the soldier or supply-
ing items needed for his existence. SUpplies for the soldier 
himself came from the Ordnance and Quartermaster-General's 
Departments, while necessary items like food and medicine came 
from the COmmissary-General of Subsistence and the SUrgeon-
General's Departments, respectively. 
The housing function fell primarily in the area of the 
Quartermaster-General, but other Departments also had interests 
in this area. The Medical and COmmissary Departments both used 
I I 
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tents and wagons supplied by the Quartermaster, and the Medical 
Department had an interest in the sanitary organization of camps. I 
These functions, then, both supply and housing, were 
! 
I 
I I 
i I 
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interdepartmental in character. During peacetime, the technical 
service departments had to coordinate their operations to carry 
out these functions. Normally, coordination was accomplished at 
the lowest possible level by officers of the departments in-
volved. For example, a unit surgeon needing a new hospital tent 
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would submit the requisition through the unit quartermaster. 
unfortunately, the Army had been operating at the small unit 
level, logistically speaking, for many years, and the functions 
of the departments were organized on this basis. There had not 
been a fo~tion of a unit larger than regimental size since 
the Civil War. l 
The discussion of supply activities and planning will 
be divided into five parts, each roughly corresponding to the 
area of a particular staff department. However, there was over-
lapping in the activities of departments, and there will there-
fore be overlapping in the scope of our examination. 
Clothing was generally within the area of the Quarter-
master's Department. By clothing is meant items of personal 
wear, and not p~eces of equipment. This distinction may seem 
picayune, but it is a matter of fact that while suspenders were 
provided by the Quartermaster's Department, belts came from the 
Ordnance Department. 
The Quartermaster-General told the Dodge Commission of 
the preparations made by his department and the department's 
capabilities in clothing manufacture. 
Question: upon the declaration of war, was the 
organization and were the regulations of the 
Department of such a character as to admit of the 
prompt equipment • • • of troops? 
Answer: The organization of the Quartermaster' s 
Department at the time specified admitted of the 
prompt equipment • • • of troops not only of the 
Army as then constituted, but of one at least 
double the size, under a condition of peace, but 
not of an army!.:.en times its size under conditions 
I I 
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of war carried out in a foreign country. 
The prevailing regulations of the Department 
were fixed under statutes and orders for a peace 
establishment, and in some respects the statutes 
were not elastic enough to meet the rapid equipment 
of a quarter of a million of men. 2 
offered a series of more detailed comments, again in response to 
the questions of the Dodge Commission. For example: 
Question: For an army of what size was the Department 
prepared to fully supply all necessary clothing, camp 
and garrison equippage [sic] on ~ril 1, l898? 
Answer: The Department on the 1st of April last was 
prepared to supply the existing Army and from 8,000 
to 10,000 men in addition for three months. 3 
The preparations of the Quartermaster's Department to 
meet the approach of war are summarized i n this reply: 
Question: What steps were taken for fully supplying 
an army of 250,000 men with suitable clothing, camp 
and garrison equipage, and what amount of material 
of each had been obtained and what amount issued up 
to August 31, l898? 
Answer: Prior to the declaration of war, the work 
of manufacture of clothing and tentage \l1a5 performed 
at our depots on a scale commensurate with the needs 
of the Army; a reasollable reserve stock being kept 
on hand. In March last, when complications with 
Spain seemed possible, this office instructed offi-
cers at manufacturing d~pota to push manufacture in 
certain l i nes, and authorized additional material 
for tentaga and clothing to be purchased, not, how-
ever, on an intensive scale, as the situation then 
did not war.rant such action. On the 20th day of 
March, the officers of the Quarte~ster's depots at 
Philadelphia, New York 3 st. Louis and Chicago were 
instructed to ascertain and report what number, kind 
and sizes of new tents complete were on hand and 
could be purchased, and how rapidly tents could be 
made by principal manufacturers, if required: this 
in order that a knowledge of the market might be had 
in case of a hasty need of tents. Purchases were 
made during the early part of April to strengthen the I J 
stock, and about the middle of that month, the depot 
quartermaster at Philadelphia was instructed to 
communicate with all manufacturers and contractors 
for blankets, blouse and shirting flannels, jersey, 
shoes, leggings and other necessaries, and ascertain 
and report at what prices and in what quantities and 
by what time they can furnish them to the Department. 4 
As in the case of transportation, the Department had 
taken steps to find out what was available, and what it would 
cost, but, since it was limited by the fund restrictions we have 
already discussed, no purchases had been permitted, at least by 
the middle of April. On April 20, with war almost a certainty, 
the Quartermaster's Department finally was allowed to begin pur-
chasing items needed for clothing and equipment. The actual pur-
chases were not effected until after war had broken out, however, 
for the order of April 20 directed the depot quartermaster in 
Philadelphia to advertise under five days' notice for these 
terials. Among the items to be furnished were jersey, blouse 
flannel, and blouse-lining material. On the same date, proposals 
days' notice were invited for the manufacture of 
lankets, shirting flannel, forage caps, drawers, leggings, pon-
hos, shoes, summer undershirts, pickaxes, shovels and other 
' tems. S The depot quartermaster was also directed to manufacture 
material he had on hand "a large number of blouses, 
shirts, and trousers. ,,6 Finally, proposals were also 
for the manufacture of a large quantity of material, 
lothing and tentage, with an aggregate value of over three mil-
ion dollars. 7 
The problem was beginning to take shape. Limited by 
L---------------------------------------------------------'----'~ 
McKinley's interpretation of the term "national defense," the 
Quartermaster's Department could only ask what was available 
until the nation stood on the brink of war, and only then begin 
to get the necessary material for making uniforms. This meant 
and then made into uniforms. Of course, under the pressure of 
time, the Government had to maintain quality control of the 
material given to it by private manufacturers. Some items of 
material could not be obtained and variations f ~om the official 
specifications had to be made, for examplel 
• • • the difficulty of production ',\1as met with in 
many • • • articles supplied by this Department, 
particularly was it the case with sky-blue kersey 
trousers, where the wool had to be dyed out of which 
to manufacture the cloth from which to make the gar-
ments. Owing to the inability to get sky-blue ker-
sey, the Department was obliged to have made some 
dark blue trousers. These trousers being lighter 
weight, were not equal in quality to those previous-
ly issued to regular troops, and were not desired 
by the troops on account of difference in color. 8 
An additional statement on the problem of quality con-
trol also is of interest. 
During all this rush, the Department was obliged to 
be most vigilant to prevent articles of inferior 
quality being imposed upon the Government. To this 
end, a large corps of inspectors had to be employed, 
and they in turn watched.~ 
Thus far, although the clothing of troops has been dis-
cussed, the subject of their equipment continually intrudes. 
Both in clothing and equipment, the problem of "lead-time" had 
to be dealt with. Even with the prompt placement of orders, 
delivery times were so far into the future that cur~ent needs 
Lo-_____________________ ~~.,.,... __ .....-rr ~
of the Army could not be met. 
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The clothing supply function includes, in addition to 
the procurement and manufacturing aspects, which have been dis-
cussed, that of distribution. As the volunteer units assembled, 
this distribution problem moved to the fore. The regular units 
had enough supplies to tide them over, because they were re-
quired to have thirty days' supplies on hand at all times. The 
interest of speed governed the procedures which followed. The 
office of the Quartermaster-General took action to insure that 
clothing would be available at the points of mobilization. Af-
ter the war, the Quartermaster-General summarized these actions 
for the Dodge Commission: 
Without waiting for requisitions or requests of any 
sort, supplies in kind and quantity judged by this 
office likely to be required were shipped in bulk 
to the various points of concentration, and the depot 
quartermasters there urged from time to time to in-
form the Quartermaster-General as the supply of any 
particular article ran low. IO 
Of course, the calculations of the officers in the office 
of the Quartermaster-General had to take into account clothing 
which had been issued to the states. They assumed, since they 
had no means of finding out (states were not required to report 
such information) that state troops were completely uniformed. 
• • • we depended a good deal on what the States 
were going to bring in, and we were very much dis-
appointed that the troops were not equipped. With 
few exceptions, the different State troops were 
not well equipped. ll 
With the above statements in mind, it is not too diffi-
cult to imagine the confusion which must have resulted from the 
I 
! 
I ~ 
j 
simultaneous arrival of the troops and their uniforms, and their 1 
~ 
resultant efforts to put the two together. The confusion is ! 
I 
well described by the harried chief quartermaster at Chickamauga I 
I 
in his reply to a question asking why the troops were not imme- I 
! diately uniformed. ! 
It is not at all singular that there should be a lack of 
uniforms in a large body of enlisted men--45 regiments--
thrown into camp from civil life, all within two weeks, 
and inspected before they had an opportunity to be sup-
plied. The work has been pushed with the utmost vigor, 
every officer of the Quartermaster-General's Department 
(three in all) working fully eighteen hours a day to 
accomplish it. The Quartermaster-General can judge from 
the amount of clothing sent what a task it must have been 
to issue it to green troops, wholly unaccustomed to forms 
and usages. 12 
The next area of consideration is one which involved a 
good deal of controversy both during and after the war, namely, 
that of weapons. The Regular Army had just been equipped with 
a modern amokeless powder rifle, the .30 caliber Rrag-Jorgenson. 
However, the Volunteers had, with few exceptions, the older, 
black powder .45 caliber Springfield. 13 
At the beginning of the war, the Army had "only 67,000 
rifles and carbines of modern pattern on hand ... 14 Roughly half ! 
! 
of these were in the hands of the Regular Army, leaving slightly I 
! 
more than thirty thousand weapons with which to equip the Vo1un- I 
teers. Needless to say, all of the Volunteers could not be 
equipped with the new weapons. 
What about the planning carried out by the ordnance 
Department? What had they done in preparation for the war? 
Like the OUartermaster's Department, the Ordnance Department 
little idea as to the size of the force they would be called on 
to arm. The Chief of Ordnance stated: 
••• I always counted on a little warning. If I could 
have had a month's warning and been that month ahead, I 
would have had those stores ready faster than they were 
demanded, no matter how early demanded, but still I would 
have had them on handf but, as it was, we were a little 
behind the demand all the time~15 j 
The ordnance Department also placed some reliance in the I 
! j 
weapons the Volunteers would be bringing with them. Its plan- i 
I 
ning was done with this in mind, although there was some skep-
ticism as to the completeness of their equipment. Again, the 
states were not required to report the condition or quantity of I 
lcheir weapons. 
When it was determined to callout the volunteers, I found 
I had this matter to look out for. It was stated to me 
that they were to take the National Guard equipment. The 
National Guard was supposed to be armed and equipped. You 
remember they have an inspector, an officer stationed in 
each State, and we relied on his reports, and we had re-
ports that they would be ready to take the field. I did 
not rely entirely upon it, and made provisions to supply 
them. I was met by this difficulty as to these arms: 
They were furnished to the states under the law for arming 
and equipping thg militia, and some of the states bought 
their own arms. l 
When the Army decided to send the Volunteer Regiments 
to Camp Thomas at Chickamauga, the Chief of Ordnance had to make 
the necessary plans and recommendations for ordnance supply. 
His recommendation that an ordnance depot be located at Camp 
Thomas was disregarded, with the result that: 
The greatest difficulty and confusion in the supply and 
equipment of the troops was experienced at Camp Thomas. 
The Chief of ordnance had recommended the establishment 
of a depot at that place, but his recommendation was not 
complied with, the general commanding the camp not 
~ 
I 
concurring because of the proximity of the arsenal at 
COlumbia, Tennessee, which arsenal, however, was soon used 
for other purposes. Had such depot been established the 
confusion and delays in the matter of equipment of the 
troops there would undoubtedly have ~een much lessened. 17 
The procurement of weapons was a problem area. The 
amount of weapons on hand at the beginning of the war has been 
mentioned. More weapons were ordered at the beginning of the 
war, but by the time they were delivered, the actual fighting 
was almost over. In order to speed the issue of weapons to the 
volunteer units, the units were requested to forward to the 
office of the Chief of Ordnance a list of the total number of 
men and the total number of weapons. Using this list, the ord-
nance Department could then determine the amount of additional 
weapons needed, and could ship them to the point of mobiliza-
tion. The hitches developed when the weapons had to be issued, 
due to the lack of ordnance personnel at places like Camp Thomas, 
and the confusion existing as a result of vast quantities of all I 
I 
types of &upplies arriving at the same point within a short time. 
The procurement of weapons was a re Rul t of the Arnl}" s 
decision to adopt a rifle which used smOkeless powder, and which 
would give the soldier the capability of multiple shots without 
reloading. The weapon which was adopted in 1892, the Krag-
Jorgensen, carried the official military designation of "U.S. 
Magazine rifle, caliber .30." Its adoption was a result of 
trials of most of the existing foreign breech actions. Between 
1892 and 1898, several small modifications were made, which, in 
accordance with Army practice, resulted in the designation of 
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rifles so modified as new models. Xrag-Jorgensens were made in 
Model 1892, 1894, and 1898. The weapon was actually made in 
both rifle and carbine form, for use by infantry and cavalry. 
The rifle had a 30-inch barrel, and the carbine a 22-inch bar-
rel. In addition to the Krags, the Army's large stock of .45 
caliber Spring fields were issued, since a smokeless powder car-
tridge had been developed for use with them. 18 
Several references have already been made to the adop-
': 
J 
I 
I 
tion and use of weapons firing amokeless powder cartridges. One i i i 
I 
of the greatest supply problems encountered by the Ordnance 
Department Was that of providing a large enough quantity of 
smokeless powder for the weapons to be used. 
use of smokeless powder were simple enough. 
I The reasons for ! 
i 
If you had a black- ' 
powder weapon, you gave away your position with your first shot. 
If you had a smokeless powder weapon, you could remain invisible1 
! 
'!'he Spanish in CUba were armed with the Model 1898 Mauser, which ~ 
fired a smokeless powder cartridge, and it would have been sui-
cidal to send men armed with a black-powder weapon into combat 
against them, especially in jungle terrain. 
~ 
'!'he necesaity for speed caused by the short notice given ! 
to the Ordnance Department and the time necesaary to prepare to 
make the new type of powder made it imperative for the Chief of 
Ordnance to decide which type of cartridge would be supplied 
! 
been fully I first, the .45 or the .30. The .45 cartridge had not 
tested yet but the .30 was ready for mass production. He decided 
to have the .30 made first, and then later to furnish the .45, 
as supplies of amokeless powder became available. 
• • • I at first gave up getting smokeless powder for the . 
caliber .45 cartridges, and we gave up very largely getting I 
smokeless powder for our coast defense works, but I in- I 
sisted upon it for our field and siege artillery and the I 
caliber .30 cartridges. In about two months, I think, I 1 
was able to get the smokeless powder for the caliber .45, I 
and after that all Og the caliber .45 were made of smoke-
less powder nearly.l 
, 
The two-month time delay mentioned in the quotation abov~ 
I 
was enough to insure that no .45 caliber smokele.s powder ammu- I 
nition was available for the expedition to CUba. 
The Chief of Ordnance, Brigadier General D. W. Flagler, 
was a Civil War veteran, and he put his experience to good us. 
in planning. We have already noted hi. skepticism about the 
amount of equipment the volunteer unit. brought to active .er-
I I 
I 
vice. He stated, concerning planning, that - •• 
I have made and all of the study I have given to 
• all the plana I 
the subject I I 
! have based them on my experience in the civil war. 1120 i 
Once again speed was the determining factor. I The Ord- .1 
nance Department never caught up with the demand for weapons, 
or supply of ammunition, until it was too late to make much dif-
ference. The reason for this delay may be found in the fact 
that, here as in many other government departments, no concrete 
commitments could be made, and although such information was 
gathered, this was of limited value as far as actual production 
of weapons went. Artillery weapons have been passed over with 
only one mention because of the fact that such weapons required 
an even longer time for production, and hence, to an even 
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! 
~ 
greater extent than with infantry and cavalry weapons, artillery I 
i 
pieces were not received in time to make much difference. I 
The food supply of the Army was the responsibility of 
the Commissary-General of Subsistence. In reply to the ques-
tions of the Dodge COmmission, he told of the conditions exist-
ing in his department at the start of the war. 
Question: On April 1, 1898, an Army of what size was the 
SUbsistence Department prepared to fully supply with offi-
cers and the necessary field rations ••• 1 
Answer. The number of Subsistence officerR in service 
April 1, 1898, including the Commissary-General and his 
office assistants, was 22. This number, if they had all 
been ordered in the field, would have been sufficient to 
properly officer with subsistence officers one army corps, 
consisting of the maximum enlisted strength authorized by 
Section 9, act of April 22, and one army corps of two-
thirds maximum enliated strength authorized by that sec-
tion. From the stores on hand in the storehouses at the 
various military posts at that time, and with such stores 
as could have been hurriedly purchased before quitting the 
duties they were engaged upon, the officers of the Subsist-
ence Department could probably have supplied an army of 
75,000 or 80,000 men with field rations for a period of 
sixty days. The duties which they left behind would have 
had to be taken up and diacharged by others before the 
lapa. of that period, however, as the duties of purchasing 
and shipping stores for an army engaged in active opera-
tions cannot be left unprovided for, nor efficiently pro-
vided for by officers who are integral parts of the active 
moving forces. 21 
Thus the Department could have supplied the army of 
75,000 to 80,000 men only by stripping its offices of every 
officer. But in so doing, the Department would have rendered 
itself incapable for further service because of the lack of 
trained personnel to direct operations from the office of the 
Commissary-General. The choice which had to be made waa clear, 
either pullout all the officers, and supply a small army for 
~-----------------------------------------------------,~~ 
sixty days efficiently or leave them in office, and trust that 
the large army would be able to handle the supplies of food with 
a minimum of trained technical help. The Regulars could be ex-
pected to deal with their problems on the basis of past experi-
ence, but Volunteer unit. had no such experiencea to draw on. 
Prom a point of hindsight vantage, the decision can still be 
defended, since the army to be supplied was over 80,000, in fact 
over 150,000 with the inclusion of McRinley'a April 22 call. 
The preparation and planning accomplished by the 
Department before the war alre outlined in the answer of the 
Commissary-General to another question of the Dodge COmmission. 
Question, Between April 1, 1898, and August 31, 1898, 
what arrangements were made for fully supplying with 
food an army of 250,000 men serving in the field and in 
camp? 
Answer: The purchasing commissaries on duty in the prin-
cipal purchasing centers of the country were already es-
tablished on April 1, and received their orders from the 
Commissary-General of SUbsistence on the breaking out of 
hostilities for the procurement and shipment of all sub-
sistence supplies, except fresh beef and freah bread, 
needed by the various camp. and in the field. These sup-
plies were forwarded to sUbaistence field depots located 
contiguous to the troops assembled in large bodi.s, the 
officers in charge of which purchaaed the fresh beef and 
fresh bread needed. These depots were placed in charge 
of officers of the regular e.tablishment who had had ex-
perience in the purchase of handling of supplies in large 
quanti tie.. '!'he lawa and regulations governing the pur-
chase and accountability for supplies are intricate and 
exacting, and the full duties connected with this branch 
of the bu8iness of the SUbsistence Department are not 
properly to be entrusted to newly appoint~d officer8, es-
pecially thos. devoid of previous military training or 
wanting in experience in the transaction of governmental 
business connected with the Army. 
The duty of obtaining from the field depots the spe-
cific articles of food which the enlisted men are entitled 
to belongs to those SUbsistence officers who are a8.igned 
to duty on the staffs of Corps, divi8ion and brigade com- ! 
missarias, and to the commanders of companies, ~~~!..~ .......  _J 
organizations. It is their duty, as an integral part 
of the combatant forces to look out for the wants of 
the enlisted men and make timely requisitions on the 
field depots for the food supplies • • • .22 
The above statement is perhaps the best single outline 
of the logistical system for any supply service. The Technical 
Service Department gave the orders for procurement of quantities 
necessary to support the amount of troops on hand, the technical 
service officers in depots at the points of mobilization broke 
this amount down into quantities for the individual units they 
were supporting, and then the matter passed to those officers 
who were appointed to staff jobs in the units, as well as the 
commanders of these units who had the responsibility of request-
ing the correct amounts of supplies to support their operations. 
With minor exceptions caused by the types of supplies involved, 
this was the system used throughout the Army establishment. In 
peacetime, the Technical Service Department provided qualified 
officers down to the staff level in the departments covering the 
various geographical areas, and the commanders placed their req-
uisitions through these officers. The difference is that in 
wartime, the peace establishment was not able to expand rapidly 
enough to place officers who were technically qualified down to 
the levels of corps, division and brigade. The War Department 
held the qualified officers at higher headquarters so that maxi-
mum use could be made of their experience. This gap between the 
technically qualified officers who were found in higher head-
quarters or in depots, and the units they were supporting was I 
I 
! 
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i When the pre-embarkation 1 
I 
filled by appointees from civil life. 
and embarkation is discussed, these problems will be seen and 
considered in detail. i 
The Commissary-General of Subsistence, like all of the ! I other technical department heads, had to arrange for the expan-
sion of his staff to meet the needs of the Army. Obviously, the 1 
twenty-two officers of his staff had to have more help in order i 
. I , 
to deal with the many problema which were arising_ He describes i 
this operation as follows I 
A large body of officers for staff duty was added to the 
SUbsistence Depa~ent by appointments made under the act 
of congre.s. 1'hey were amply supplied from the field 
depot., and after food supplies for the soldiers had been 
drawn by them [line officers] from the depots those sup-
plies were under the control of the commanding generals 
and their staffs and were as much in the possession of 
I 
the troops as were the wa90ns, horses and other facilities ' 
necessary for their distribution among the men. The 
Commissary-General of Subsistence could exercise no direct 
control over the stores nor the officers after issue ex-
cept to require the officers to render accountability 
papers showing whether the disposition of the stores was 
warranted by law, regulations, and proper orders, and to 
cause the officers to be charged with the money value in 
the case of any improper application on their part shown 
by the accountability papers. 23 . 
The problem of the technical service departments was I 
! 
complicated by the fact that, because of their position as staff i 
Z 
officers they could only recommend, not order, actions which 
they thou9ht necessary. What happened when the recommendation 
of the Chief of Ordnance regarding establishment of a depot at 
I Camp Thomas was disregarded by the cOmmanding General of that l 
~ 
place has already been described. ! 
In the area of equipment there was a division in I 
, 
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responsibility all the way from procurement to final issue to 
the soldier. Certain i taus of equipment were the responsibility I 
! 
of the Ordnance Department, and the only time the ouartermaster's l 
Department had anything to do with them was in the tranaporta-
tion phase. 
At first glance, this problem does not seem to be too 
J 
I 
! 
I 
I 
,j 
i 
complex. In a 109ical approach, each technical service depart- ! 
lIlant would handle thoae items pertaining to its area. I '!'he prob- i 
I 
1_ arises when the decision must be made as to what area a par- ! 
ticular item falls into. This problem was brought up before the I 
I 
Dodge Commission in the following words. 
A soldier now, in order to get a meal, must make requisi-
tions on three different departments of the government 
and have three different requisitions approved?24 
It was true. The ovens and other necessary cooking 
utensils were drawn from the Olartermaster, while the soldier's 
individual eating utensils came from ordnance, and the food, of 
course, from the Commissary of SUbsistence. 
'!'he Ordnance Department made many of the i tams it was 
responsible for, and had been preparing to make more of them 
before the war starteCl. '!'his preparation had been delayed by 
the refusal of Congress to grant an appropriation for machinery 
to be used in a new ordnance plant. 
'!'he Department did not have on hand at the beginning of 
the war any large supply of infantry, cavalry, artillery 
and horse equipments. '!'he buildings for a plant for their 
manufacture had been erected at Rock Island Arsenal, but 
the plant itself had not been installed through failure to 
obtain the necessary appropriation. 
In the first issues of equipments to troops there was 
I 
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~ 
some delay caused by the lack of proper plant for their 
manufacture, and as they were not on the market as art~­
cles of commerce, they could not be purchased at once. S 
~ 
1 , 
! 
I The items referred to were things such as cartridge I 
belts, ammunition pouches, and the various types of packs and I 
pack straps. SUbstitutes were tried, but they proved unservice- I 
! 
i 
I 
able. 
The OUartermaster's Department ran into trouble in the 
supplying of land transportation equipment in the fo~ of horses~ 
mules, wagons, harnesses, and saddles. Before the start of the I 
i 
war, the Quartermaster's Department directed its quartermaster 
to query major manufacturers of wagons, saddles, and harnesses 
to determine what price. would be, how long it would take to 
deliver them in quantity, and similar information. 26 No orders 
were placed, however, and once again the government had to face 
up to the phenomenon known as "lead time," that is, the amount 
of time to develop or manufacture an item from first order or 
design to final delivery . At the start of the war the govern-
ment had 1,198 wagons and 4,963 sets of harness on hand. 
Of course, animals were needed to pull the wagons, and 
I 
I 
their procurement was also a source of difficulty. Before the I 
i 
war, boards of Regular Army officers representing line and ! 
I 
Quartermaster officers had made all purchase. of public animals. i 
! 
Now, under the stress of war, only individual Quartermaster i 
officers could be spared to do this purchasing. Added to the I 
wear and tear on these officers was the change in quantities 
needed. Average prices paid for government animals declined 
i 
! 
I 
£: 
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from the period July 1, 1897 to March 31, 1898 during the period 
of the war. A few examples will serve to illustrate this 
decline. cavalry horses had been bought at an average cost of 
1 
, 
$126.15 during the earlier period, and sold during the War at I 
$100.42 on the average. Artillery and draft horses showed simi- ! 
~ 
lar price changes, with the artillery beasts going from $137.79 
average to $130.85, and draft animals dropping from $148.11 to 
$125.38. However, there was one area in which prices did in-
crease, namely that of mules. Before the war, draft mules were i 
being obtained for an average $99.84 and pack mules for an aver-
age $72~93. With the outbreak of hostilities, prices went up to 
$110.05 for draft mules and $83.15 for pack mules. 27 Several 
officers testified that quantity buying reduced the prices paid 
for horses. Officers buying mules, however, discovered collu-
sion among dealers to drive prices up. 
During the course of the war, the Army also procured. 
Por the period of the 
I 
vast amounts of wagons and harness sets. 
war, 5,179 wagons of various types were bought for a total of 
I $478,111.10, and 28,012 sets of harnesses for a total of I 
$358,449.18. Average costs of the wagons varied from $66.28 I 
for a farm wagon to $260.26 for a spring wagon. 28 i However, most i 
of these items did not arrive in time for use in the combat 
phases of the war. 
To pull these wagons and the ambulances needed by the 
Medical Department, the government purchased 16,618 horsea and 
20,182 mules. By the end of the war, 16,483 horses and 19,550 
i 
I , 
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j 
mules had been issued to troops. 29 l 
The actual issuing of equipment by both Ordnance and I 
, 
Quartermaster's Departments followed the procedure commented on I 
I in our discussion of the Subsistence Department. Equipment pro- i 
cured was sent to the point of issue, and officers of the Depa~ 
ment on the spot handled the issue either directly to line unit. I 
l 
as was the case with the ordnance supplies at Camp Thomas, or I 
l 
I 
to staff officers at sub-depots such a8 the ones established j 
for ordnance and quartermaster supplies at Tampa. I 
One area of equipment which haa not been covered is that i 
of tentage, which has been ignored in order to include it in our 
discussion of troop housing. 
The final area of equipment is that of medical supplies. 
A concise summary of the Department's pr~ar preparations is 
given by the Dodge COmmission's final report. -Prior to the 
declaration of war, no preparation for the approaching conflict 
had been made by the Medical Department. ,,30 However, judgement 
should be reserved at least until we have noted the problems 
under which the department had to operate in the area of logis-
tics. 
The medical supplies on hand were only what remained at 
the post of the semi-annual issue of the preceding 
January, the several purveying depots at New York, st. 
Louis, and San Francisco not having as yet received any 
of the medicines and stores contracted for in anticipation 
of the regular i.sue of the coming July. Models of im-
proved medical and hospital chests had been determined 
upon, but no contracts for such chests had been given, 
nor was it thought that bids for them could be legally 
asked for. 
The need of a hoapi tal ship had been made known to the 
i Secretary of War, but no steps had been taken to secure 1 
such vessel. only $20,000 had been given to the Depart- I 
ment out of the $50,000,000 emergency fund, and the Secre- I 
tary of War had directed the surgeon-General to make no \ 
purchases until the question of whether or not there was I 
to be war had been definitely settled.3l i 
! 
Obviously, little preparation could be accomplished with I 
, 
, the Secretary of War forbidding expenditures but little Planning ! 
seems to have been done, for it was not until May that the f 
Surgeon-General realized how great the shortages were, and took 
the first stepa to insure that the troops then being mobilized 
would have the necessary medical supplies on hand. 
The several .upply depots having but little material on 
hand, the Surgeon General on the lrd of May telegraphed 
the governors of the various state. asking that their 
~i 
troops might take with them the medical and hospital sup-
plies belonging to them as national guard organizations. 
Sixteen of the States were found to be without such sup- I 
plies and a large number of the others had them in but 
limited quantities, so that moat of the volunteer regiment. i 
on arrival at camp Thomas ~~ camp Alger had neither medi- ! 
cines nor hospital stores. 
Once again the Regular Army had assumed that the Nationru. 
Guard would have certain i tams on hand, and once again this was 
not true. Tbe cries of st ate politicians and guard officers 
that their troop. were ready were in part responsible for this 
error. However, since these troops were now part of the federal 
foroe., little could be done except to order the necessary sup-
plies and hope that they would come to the units in time for 
effective use. ! ! 
The words of the Dodge Commission report once again fur- I 
list- : 
I 
~ 
niah a vivid statement of the logistical problema, and the 
ing for the Medical Department is indeed comprehensive. 
~ , 1-___________________ ~~._..f~_-.lS'ret~.rm_._,J, 
What were the ransons for the existence of these wants? 
In the first place the almost absolute lack of any sup-
plies in store when the war broke out. Medicines could be 
purchased in any quantity and without delay, as could bed-
ding and certain articles of hospital furniture, but other 
articles of adopted pattern, as surgical instrument. or 
cots of special design, could not. Time was lost in having 
manufactured standard chests of various kinds to contain 
drugs, stores dressings, furniture, etc., and the making 
of these articles never kept up with the demand for them. 
Next, the too restricted supply table, which might very 
properly have had upon it a number of drugs in common use 
in civil life, the issue of which had not been authorized 
by the Medical Department of the Army. 
Next, the lack of knowledge on the part of untrained 
medical officers how to get what they needed when it was 
on hand and ready for issue. 
Next, the unwise restrictions put upon medical officers 
by chief surgeons, notably at Camp Thomas, as respects the 
form of requisitions and the articles that might be called 
for. 
Next, the taking away of regimental supplies to fit up 
division hospital., and the issue of medicines to regiments 
only through these hospitals. 
Next, the actual want of supplies at local depots or the 
difficulty of getting them out of such depots on approved 
requisitions. 
Next, the necessary draining of scantily supplied depots 
to fit out troops about t.o move. 33 ! 
I 
The comment concerning the inability of the Department I 
I to make enough supplies to keep up with the demand is reminis-
cent of the comment of the Olief of Ordnance concerning ordnance I 
i terns of equipment. An interesting point is the remark about I 
~ 
the lack of knowledge of requisitioning and issue procedures. 
It highlights an area seldom mentioned by either primary or 
secondary works, the preparation of the volunteer officer for 
active service. Medical officers of volunteers often found con-
ditions with the Army in the field considerably different from 
their comfortable practices at home, and few doctors had the 
~ 
! 
training necessary to supervise sanitation operations and insure ! 
'-_____________________ ~ _ _______ ~~ __ J
healthful conditions for the troops in their units. The requi-
8itioning of supplies necessary for such operations falls into 
the category we are discussing. The system of requisitioning 
was not sufficiently flexible to deal with non-atandard items, 
, and often requisitions were returned for administrative rather 
than medical reasons. 
Mention of the depot system of operations for medical 
logistics is seen. The problems again seem to be the same, too I 
j 
J few officers, too few supplies alld not enough time. i 
The next area of discussion is that of troop housing. I 
This disaussion divides itself naturally into two parts, discus- I 
~ 
.ion of sites and their choosing, and discussion of the material I 
available for housing the troops, that is, tentage. OUr exami- I 
nation of the pro~lem of site choice. has been limited to the I 
camp areas in the south where the troops who moved to Tampa were ! 
! 
stationed before the move. The selection of the sites, it will i 
be remembered, had in some cases, notably those of Chickamauga I 
and Tampa, been entrusted to the chief quartermasters of the 
departments at the same time the Regular Army was mobilized. 34 
However, there were larger reasons behind the selection of 
Tampa, which will bear examination. The Secretary of War, R.A. 
Alger, explained his reasons for choosing Tampa as one of the 
points of assembly. 
I 
Question: Why was Tampa selected as the base of operation.s? 
Answer: on account of the shipping facilities at that ; 
point and its coraparati ve short distance from CUba, render- I. 
ing any movement of the troops p08sible on short notice a~ ! 
I 
the progress of the blockade or any other sudden condition 
might require. J5 
An interesting point is developed a little later in 
r , 
1 
~ 
! 
.\ 
Secretary Alger's statement, when he says, " ••• A permanent I 
• 
camp was never contemplated at Tampa ... J6 Thus the invasion port, ' 
which was also a point of assembly, was selected because of its 
proximity to CUba, and the fact that it had railroad facilities, 
but the Army never intended to use it for a long-term camp. In 
the discussion of the pre-embarkation and embarkation phases it 
will be seen that the Army had erred in its estimate of Tampa'. 
utility a. a shipping point. The camp facilities were indeed 
temporary. Before discussing the nature of these facilities, 
especially in the area of housing, the selection of some of the 
other points should be discussed. 
A general cOllll1'lent on the reasons for selection of the 
southern camps at Fernandina, Jacksonville, and Tampa again 
reinforce what we have just said about Tampa and transportation. 
Question: Why were summer camps organized at Pernandina, 
Jacksonville, and Tampa? 
Answer: All of the early camps in the South were selected 
with special regard for the health of the troops ~9 their 
convenience for prompt movement by rail and water. 
The use of Chickamauga Park was an assembly area for 
troops had been envisioned when the park area of 7,000 acres 
was set aside. This camp, like those at Tampa, New orleans, 
Mobile, and later camps in the north, was covered by the chief 
quartermasters of geographical departments, who selected the 
I I 
I 
! 
I 
I j 
I; 
! , 
I 
! 
I I 
! 
! 
.1 -~ 
camp sites, and made a general report on the area, the railroads ! 
i 
f ____ ~i 
r--------_____________________ ''"J·~·.~~>:)'ur~.Q..'''"''''''~~'lt\O' .. .,1t .. '>f;''';.'.'; 
usable, the water supply, and other items of interest to the 
Army. 
, 
1 
I 
i 
Secretary Alger listed his reasons for assembling troops I 
! 
in large camps in his book on the Spanish-American War. '!'he I 
comments are intended to be general, but they have particular I ; 
? 
significance for the camps at Chickamauga and Tampa, which were I 
the largest, and about which many complaints were made. . 
The War Department has been criticized for assembling so 
many troops in large camps. The reasons for such action 
may be stated as follows I 
1. The supply bureaus could not establish in each of 
the forty-five state. depots for rationing volunteers 
during the period required to manufacture and ship equip-
ment for thea. rec:rui ts. Moreover, there were not enough 
Regular Army officers in the Quartermaster's, Commissary, 
Medical, and Ordnance Departments to detail one of each 
kind to so many scattered State camps, and Regular Army 
officers alone at that time were qualified to do the work. 
2. It was desirable to place volunteer regiments in 
camps with regulars, in order that the former might have 
the example and instruction that seasoned troops might 
furnish. I 
3. It was deemed undesirable to have volunteer organi-
zations remain in their own states any longer than was 
absolutely necessary for the mustering-in process, in that 
home influences tended to retard military discipline. 
i 
! 
I 
I 
I 
4. Imnlediate drill in brigade, division, and corps 
manoeuvres was of the first importance, as the experience 
of the Civil War had demonstrated this could only be 
accomplished in large camps of instruction. 
S. Considerations of national moment, which subsequent i 
events proved wis., suggested the brigading of regiments, ! 
not from the same State, but from the four great geographi- I 
cal divisions-North, South, East and West. 38 I 
It is worth emphasizing that the first reason mentioned 
by the Secretary is that of logistics, and that his comments 
reinforce the information we have developed concerning the 
several departments, namely, that they were not able to cover 
all of the areas where they might profitably have been used. 
The selection of the camps was made with another object 
in mind, one which was assumed by all to such an extent that it 
is not even mentioned in any reports, correspondence or memo-
randa. This was the basic assumption that all of the unite 
would be living in tents. One writer does mention a western 
governor who would not let his men camp in tents in the field 
because they would get wet if it rained. 39 The problem of 
tentage was one which was of such magnitude that the Quarter-
master-General commented. "The chief difficulties were in 
tti t t .40 ge ng en age • • • • 
i 
1 
l 
ti 
1 
I 
! j 
! 
I 
! 
The Quartermaster's Department had made preparations for i 
I 
providing tentage within the limits imposed by President 
McKinley's interpretation of ·national defense," spending no 
money, but asking what was available, in case of war. 
I 
I 
! 
On the 26th day of March, the officers of the quartermaster i 
depots at Philadelphia, New Yon, St. Louis, and Chicago t 
were instructed to ascertain and report what number, kind I 
and sizes of new tents complete were on hand and could be I 
purchased, and how rapidly tents could be made by principal ·· 
manufacturers, if required, this in order that knowledge ~f I 
the market might be had in case of a hasty need of tents. ~ 
I 
i The Quartermaster-General was questioned on the amount 
~ 
of material available at the start of the war during the hearinga 
~ 
i of the Dodge COmmission. lj 
~ ) Question. '1'0 What extent was the standard cotton duck used ! 
in the manufacture of tent. on hand and at the outbreak of I 
the war • • • in the market. f 
Answer. Well, as aoon as the trouble became very probable, i 
or, at all events, when the war was declared, I sent around 
to different dealers and bought all the duck I could buy, 
and I don't think that exceeded over 200,000 yards, that 
is, to the beat of my recollection. 
Question: Did the manufacturers anticipate trouble to any 
, , ________________________________________ ~ ____ ¥~_~_n_Tu ______ ~~M ~
extent and beg i n to manufacture all these things? 
Answer a I do not think so. '!'hey kept on hand a large 
stock of what is merchantable duck in the general market. 
You can get that, but our duck is made up from specifica-
tions, and, of course, they don't keep any very large 
quantity of it on hand. 
Question a It is rather a better quality than what is made 
for the general market? 
Answer a Better duck.42 
The records of the Quartermaster-General's office are ! 
\ 
very detailed on the subject of tentage, and material for making I 
! 
I 
',; 
tents. The merchantable duck purchased was no doubt suitable 
for short-term camping, but not for extended field use. The 
I 
reference of the Quartermaster-General to a purchase of approxi- I 
I 
mately 200,000 yards of duck may refer to one of two types pur- I 
chased during the period May 1 through August 30. The records I 
indicate that 230,000 yards of 12-ounce duck were ordered during I 
this period, and 180,000 yards of 10-ounce duck.43 I .• 
Generally speaking, the ouartermaster's Department was ! 
I not well prepared in the way of tentage at the start of the war. 
on hand as of April 1 were 1,761 common tents, 325 conical wall 
tents, 218 hospital tents, 9,863 shelter halves, 487 wall tents 
and 71 tents of various other kinds. In addition to these 
tents, the Army had on contract for delivery or manufacture 763 
common tents, 278 conical wall tents, 148 hospital tents, 6,519 
shelter halves, 411 wall tents, and none of the miscellaneous 
types.44 The Department had been making tents, but its capacity 
was not great enough to meet the demand. During the period 
April 30 through August 15, the Quartermaster depots manufac-
tured 4,923 common tents, 24 conical wall tents, 426 hospital 
fr"-------...... ---------i.U~~~~~"l'!.'01.''''~=~~' ..... "\!oit., .. '.,'IM' ... ~'!.~(~w'.;·;·~ 
~ tents, 197,502 shelter halves and 668 wall tents. By compari-
son, during the same period, the government had to contract for 
or purchase 43,077 common tents, 716 conical wall tents, 5,920 
hospital tents, 174,877 shelter halves and 7,982 wall tents. 
In addition, some 1,244 irregular tent. were also purchased or 
contracted for during this period.45 
i 
1 
1 
These figure. indicote that in every category except I 
that of shelter halves, the government had to depend on industry I 
to produce more than it had been doing_ ! Why was the government l 
able to outproduce industry on shelter halves? The reason was 
that the government had prepared to produce many of these with 
the expectation of field service. The other tents were of de-
signa generally available, while the shelter halves were an 
excluaively military item. 
OUestion. How soon, General, were you able to meet the 
demand for tents? 
Answer. Well, we met the demand right along as beat we 
could. We at once began to puah forward especially the 
manufacture of shelter tents, becaus!6that waa the equip-
ment for an army in the field ••• 
This preparation for the production of ahelter halvea 
included getting the necesaary material, which proved to be a 
problem area. 
Question. Is the material out of which shelter tents are 
made- must that be manufactured? 
Answer a Yes, we have a specification for that, but we got 
as much of it as we could, and we took as much of other 
suitable kinds aa we could get. There seemed to be a good 
deal of trouble in getting suitable material. 
Question: It is heavier, of course, than anything that i. 
called muslin, but not so heavy aa canvas. 
Answer. The point was to get an article that would shed 
water, and you have to get a very closely woven duck or 
drill to do that. 
Question, What is the standard material, is it drill, or 
plain white duck? 
Answer a It is plain white duck, but we bought a great 
deal of4~rill, too. It is questionable which is the 
better. 
During the period May 1 thru JUne 30, the Army ordered 
562,828 yards of what is described as Yshelter tent material,Y 
with an additional 534,828 yards being ordered by August 15.48 
Hospital tents were an item which was needed by the 
Army, but as we noted above, the quantity on hand was 218, with 
148 more on contract. Again questions were asked as to the 
supply of this item. 
Question a As to the hospital tents, what supply had you 
on hand at the outbreak of war, and how soon were you able 
to meet the demands of the troops in the field for a full 
equipment in that respect? 
Answer. • • • we did not have many, but there never was a 
time that I could not meet the demand for hospital tents 
that I know of, and I do not recollect a single applica-
tion which was approved by the Surgeon-General which was 
not met by us. 4§here might have been in the beginning, 
for a few days. 
The issue of suppliea ia an area which is critical to 
the examination which ia being conducted. The facta available 
for tentage are complete enough so that a aingle item can be 
traced down to the issue to depots, aa an illustration of how 
the system worked. 
Between May 1 and JUne 30, 1898, the Quartermaster's 
Department isaued 1,722 hospital tents to the Army aa a whole. 
Of this total, 306 were issued to Jacksonville, 753 to 
Chickamauga, 16 to Miami, 202 to Tampa, 35 to Key West, and 
50 to Fernandina. This issues totalled 1,362 hospital tents, 
or all but 360 of the tents issued to the ArmY.SO It appears 
that the troops who were closest to the points of embarkation 
were being supplied. Even if we did not already know that most 
of the Regular Army was at Tampa, and forty-five regiments of 
volunteers were at Chickamauga, with other smaller units scatter-
ed at points like Jacksonville, Miami, Key West, and Fernandina, 
we would be able to guess that most of the Army was at the 
points mentioned by looking at the supply figures from which 
our information about hospital tents have been drawn. 
A general comparison of the figures for issues and the 
number of tents purchased indicates that the tents were going 
out to the troops. In fact, for the period May 1 thru June 30, 
the issues exceed the amounts purchased, reflecting the deple-
tion of the Army's stock on hand. The testimony of the Quarter-
master-C~neral indicates that, in general, the units of the 
Regular Army had the full allowance of tentage at the start 
of the war. Sl This would mean that the bulk of the issues 
were being made to the volunteers. The total issue figures of 
the Quartermaster's Department tend to support this, with most 
of the issues being directed to the depot at Chickamauga, where 
the volunteers were assembling in great numbers. Tampa runs a 
close second to Chickamauga in total volume handled, but the 
amounts run only 30 to 50 percent of the totals for ChiCkamauga. 
This would aeem to indicate that the quantities flowing i nt o 
Tampa were going to the equipping of the volunteers there. 
Some of theae regiments had already been equipped, for instance, 
the Seventy-First New York, and the First Volunteer Cavalry 
(Rough Riders). The Seventy-First brought their tents with 
them from New York, and the Rough Riders moved to Tampa from 
their rendezvous at San Antonio, Texas, where they had been 
living in tents. However, as the cautious note of our conunents 
above indicate, it is not possible to state positively that the 
bulk of issues were going to the volunteers, because the records 
of the Quartermaster-General's office show only iS8ues to 
depots, and the information needed i8 only to be found in the 
records of those depots, which do not seem to have survived. 
What is significant about this analysis is that the 
depot system was functioning and units were receiving issues 
of tentage with a8 little delay as pos8ible. 
The activities of the various technical service 
departments have been reviewed and the problems occurring in 
the supply and housing areas listed. Throughout this treat-
ment, incidental references have been made to Tampa as supply 
depot, railhead, port, etc. The situation at Tampa during the 
pre-embarkation and embarkation phases i8 the next area for 
consideration. During the discussion, some of the points made 
in the examination thus far will again be mentioned, with the 
result of an earlier decision shown in actual action. In 
order to keep the treatment organized, the same general areas 
of discussion will be treated, that is, transportation, supply, 
and housing. In addition, references will be made to the 
discussion of mobilization. 
CHAPTER IV 
SURVEY OF RESULTS IN PRE-EMBAlU(A'l'ION 
AND EMBAlU(ATION 
The stage has been set. The troops have been mobilized 
or mustered, the mechanics of their arming, equipping, feeding 
and moving have been discussed and the apparatus for getting 
medicine described. The preparations made to get this force 
supplied have been discussed as well as the problems which 
existed in this regard. The ultimate test of the organization 
described is their functioning in the movement of an army to 
war. After this, the lessons learned from it will be described, 
and the effect of these lessons on the men, the plans, and the 
organization of the Army. 
In the section on troop housing, the reasons for the 
choice of Tampa as an assembly point and invasion port were 
described. Some further description of the area seems to be in 
order. F. E. ChadwiCk gives an excellent view of the area in 
his Relations of the u.s. and Spainl 
Tampa, selected as the base for the army which it was 
expected to send to CUba, is on a shallow arm of Tampa 
Bay, in a perfectly flat district of coral sand, covered 
at this time with open forests of moderate-sized pines. 
From the sandy and absorbent character of the soil, and 
the shade offered by the park-like distribution of the 
pines, it was in many ways an ideal point for a large 
camp. The vast and palatial Tampa Bay Hotel, the only 
building of value (separated by an arm of the bay from the 
small town, made up of cheap wooden structures used as 
cigar factories, in which most of the employees were 
eubans) was an important element as affording excellent 
headquarters. Ten miles southwest was Tampa Fort, the 
head of navigation, and the terminus of the railway. 
This was the point of departure of the Plant Line of 
steamers for Key West and Havana. The railway was the 
property of Mr. Plant, under whose able administration 
the district had been developed • • • • The chief draw- 1 
back was the heat of the district at this seaaon • • • • 
Chadwick's description is the only one in either primary 
or secondary literature that gives a capsule view of the area. 
Most other mentions are in testimony taken at Tampa by the Dodge 
Commission, which was able to see the arrangement of things for 
itself, and they t~nd to skip details. The Dodge Commission was 
interested in obtaining an idea of the climate, terrain, and 
living conditions in the Tampa area, and in order to get this 
information it interviewed a local resident, Colonel J. B. 
Anddrson. They began by asking why Tampa had been selected, and 
the Colonel gave approximately the same reasons which were 
quoted above. He then proceeded to give an account of Tampa' s 
climate, health, and terrain. 
• • • I have been informed that was their report, that of 
all the places they visited and investigated it was their judgement Tampa, from every standpoint, was the best they 
could find. That was one reason, and another reason--I 
don't know, of course, What was in the minds of the men 
who came here to look over the ground--and certainly, from 
our standpoint, thought Tampa--its location, its proximity 
to the island of CUba, its healthfulness, its water facili-
ties, an almost land-locked water route-waterway from Tampa 
to CUba, Tampa to Key West, giving a distance of open sea 
of only 90 milea--would certainly make it the best place 
in the United States. I don't see any reason why it is 
not considered and could not have been considered at the 
time, prior to the time, and aince the troops came down, 
from every standpoint, the best place for the embarkation 
of the troops. Our health record--I think the facts and 
figures show is the best of any southern seacoast town in 
the united States. I think the health statistics taken by 
the State health officials show that. We have a stated 
population of 26,000 or 27,000 people, and our average 
death rate is from 28 to 35 people per month, and most of 
these deaths are among the ordinary classes of people and 
negroes, Who are poorly clad and in a measure, poorly fed 
and living in very ordinary small cabins, as you know the 
poor class of people in all towns do. As I said, we have 
a population of 26,000 or 27,000 people, and about 8,000 
of these are CUbans. The larger percentage of deaths has 
been among the CUbans, and next among the Negro people. 
I have been living in Tampa seven years, and, with the 
exception of a few old people, we have not had five deaths 
among the better class of people in the town. 
General McCOok a That is a good record. 
Mr. Anderson. A great many people north think that dur-
ing the summer we fairly roast down here, but as a matter 
of fact, as I told some of the gentlemen in Washington a 
week or two ago, we suffered more from heat the week we 
were there than we did all summer here. The sun gets hot 
here in the summer, but there is alway. a good breeze, and 
our rainy season comes on in the summer. I don't mean by 
that it rains all the time, but we have a shower almost 
every day, and a good deal of thunder and lightning, and 
then the sky clears up, and a breeze springs up, &nd at no 
time during the seven years I have been here without a 
break, with the exception of possibly ten or fifteen days, 
when away on a trip, have I seen a night it was 80 hot I 
could not sleep, and have never seen a day too hot for a 
person unused to the sun, if he kept out of the sun. But 
the laborers never suffer. Never have a sunstroke. I have 
seen men out on top of buildings painting the roofs--about 
as hot a place as I know of--and working on railroads, and 
I have never known a man to be prostrated from heat or die 
from sunstroke. We have good water, we have a good climate, 
and we have a good, healthful--I don't know whether to say 
soil or not, but there seems to be a lack of one or more 
~f the conditions here necessary to produce what is called 
malarial fever, a continued fever, or swamp fever. I have 
never seen but one man, and I saw him a few days ago, Mr. 
Cooper, the business manager of the Daily Times, during my 
seven years in Tampa, have a spell of chills and fever such 
as they have in Virginia. I have heard one doctor say and 
physicians connected with the Red Cross who have been in 
town quite a while say they don't think there is such a 
thing as malaria. They think there is no malaria here. 
In one of our interviews with General Alger, I told him 
there was only one thing we demurred to, and that was 
having all of the sickness that developed among the 801-
diers in CUba and Porto Rico and the camps throughout the 
Whole country being charged to Tampa. While he, of course, 
saw the point, he laughingly remarked, "Inasmuch as the 
Secretary of War was held responsible for all of the sick-
ness in the Army, and he had taken the responsibility of 
selecting Tampa as the point of embarkation, he thought he 
ought to assist in bearing the brunt. "2 
Mr. Anderson's testimony as to reasons is further borne 
out by that of General Nelson A. Miles, who stated that H ••• 
if we were going to send a large force, • • • it was the best 
place that could be found •••• ,,3 His reasons refer to the 
type of port fa.cilitie8 at Port Tampa where "Nine steamers could 
,,4 His comments were ampli-be loaded at the same time • • • • 
fied by further testimony describing the exact nature of the 
facilities, namely, " ••• a canal possibly half a mile long 
••• ,"S which would provide the loading facilities mentioned 
by naneral Miles, as well as a pier and a loading slip extending 
out into Tampa Bay. 
The camping facilities for troops around Tampa itself 
were good, they were on relatively high ground, which afforded 
drainage in case of wet weather, but it was pointed out that 
the ground around Port Tampa was low, as Tolight be expected near 
a natural harbor. This ground would be unsuitable for occupa-
tion during the rainy season, but could be used when the weather 
was dry. The troops put into Tampa and the surrounding area 
were housed on the high ground. 
The railroads running into Tampa, and from Tampa to 
Port Tampa, are of major interest, since they were the major 
I I :::::i::r:V~ w::::~: :::::i~::9~~~a~e::et:l::~~a_ I t_ controlled by the a .... man who had developed th: area around 
i Port Tampa, and the Florida Central and Peninsular. From Tampa 
~ i to Port Tampa, there was only a single line of railroad track, 
, owned by the Plant Syat.e. 7 
The first steps taken by the Army to use Tampa as a 
railroad receiving point came in early May, when a number of 
military personnel and civilian specialists were sent to Tampa. 
Among this group was a civilian transportation clerk, George R. 
Few, who later testified as to the use of the railroads at Tampa 
Few arrived at Tampa May 5th, and before two weeks were out, he 
was faced with a problem of colossal proportions. Congestion 
of the railroad track. was being caused by tremendous shipments 
intended for the troops who were to go there, or who were 
already there. The period of congestion is mentioned by Fewl 
"This congestion was about May 15 to May 30. OUr heaviest 
receipts [sic] of cars was up to, say, JUne 10 or 12, and then 
we began to break the blockade •••• "8 
The Ol.ief of the Transportation Branch of the Office of 
the Quartermaster-General, Colonel Charles Bird, was questioned 
concerning the railroad problem, and brought to light the item 
of competition between the Plant System and the Florida central 
and Peninsular. 
• • • there has been great complaint made • • • of stagna-
tion there at Tampa, resulting from the congestion of cars 
and the great trouble in getting things from Tampa to Port 
Tampa. We understand that there were two railroads at 
that time handling the cars, by what is known as the 
Florida Central and Peninsular and the Plant System. Will 
you explain to the commission the steps taken by the Quar-
termaster's Department in getting ••• from Tampa to Port 
Tampa previous to starting for CUba? 
Answer I The Plant System owned the line from Tampa to Port 
Tampa, Florida Central, which is the road you speak of, had 
their terminal in Tampa. We had very poor facilities for 
transferring the food and troops that passed over their 
line to the direct line leading to Port Tampa. The Plant 
people wanted to cut them out and put a heavy arbitrary 
on, that is, if their cars were transferred--it was a rail-
road dodge--they wanted to shut out our shipping stores at 
allover the Florida Central and confine us to the Plant 
System, and they put this heavy arbitrary on so they could 
not handle cars, and in order to overcome that we insisted 
upon storehouses being built at certain points, and tracks 
--putting switches in, so we could handle freight and cars 
over these roads. 9 
Brigadier General C. F. Humphrey went into greater de-
tail on the railroad squabble and the specific problem of trans-
ferring freight. 
Question: • • • was there any friction between the Plant 
System and the Plorida Central and Peninsular Railroad? 
1\nswer: Yes, sir. 
Question a Resulting in the congestion of the traffic of 
the U.S.? 
Answer a Yes, sir. 
Question: If so, to what extent did it delay the trans-
portation? 
Answer a It delayed it in this way: They would greatly 
delay or not accept cars from the Plorida Central and 
Peninsular. 
OUestion: Simply would not do it? 
Answer: Yes, sir. They had a connecting track laid in 
one of the streets of the city, but they failed to use it 
to any considerable extent until compelled to do so. There 
was a large storehouse to be built, and by some manipula-
tion it was placed on the side of their [Plant's] track, 
but I had it taken down and put up between the two roads 
where they nearly come together. The two roads run within 
a ahort diatance of each other at one point near the city 
and then branch off to their stations, about three-quarters 
of a mile apart. The Plant System was required to con-
struct or permit of the construction of a connecting track 
10 
at or near the first-named point. 
The situation at Tampa may be likened to a giant funnel, 
with someone periodically cutting off half of the flow into the 
wide part. The Plant System with its single track was the nar-
row part of the funnel, and by delaying or refusing to handle 
cars from the Florida Central and Peninsular it impeded the out-
flow of supplies at Port Tampa. By JUne 4, the situation had 
become so confused that the Quartermaster-General had to direct 
his officers to use both the Plant and F. C. & P. lines equally. 
This was apparently in response to the demands of the Plant Sys-
tem for the lion's share of the traffic. ll 
As a result of the delays in movement over the single 
track to Port Tampa, cars began to pile up on sidings north of 
Tampa. The only thing to do was to unload things at Tampa, and 
get the most important items to the depot. and thence to the 
troops. But a new problem arose, that of finding the cars with 
the most important items, or in fact, of finding any items. Mr. 
Ff!M explains this problem in his testimony. 
Question: Can you explain to m~ why there was such a con-
gestion of railway trains here in supplying the command 
which left for CUba? What was the occasion for that? 
Answer I I do not know exactly what the occasion was. 
They were supplying us from all directions--St. Louis, 
New York, Chicago, and, in fact, all points where troops 
came from. 
Question: Were the contents of these cars sent to you 
properly billed? 
Answer: Yes, sir, but they lacked car numbers, that is, 
the numbers of the cars were not specified on the bills of 
lading. 
Question: And therefore you could not tell what was in 
these cars? 
Answer: No, sir. 
Question: And who is responsible for that? 
Answer: I think the quartermasters and majors were. 
Question: At points of shipment. 
Answer: Yes, sir. We called the attention of the 
Quartermaster-General to that, and afterwards we notified 
the Quartermaster-General of the condition of affairs here 
of the car numbers on the bills of lading. He notified 
the shipping officers, and they inserted the car numbers 
on the bills of lading, and that enabled us to check the 
freight as it came in. 
Question: Now you say that was on account of the cars not 
being numbered? 
Answer: In one sense of the word it was. Of course, the 
cars came in here and we could not locate the stores we 
needed the most. 
Question: To what extent did the congestion exist? 
Answer: It was in such shape that we could not get at the 
freight as we wanted it on account of track room here. • • • 
Question: Were these tracks filled up for miles? 
Answer: Yes, sir. 
Question: How many? 
Answer: I do not know exactly. I suppose all the side 
tracks were filled up. I know in one instance we had 
stores, and they said th~ went 17 miles from here to 
Turkey Creek side track. 12 
The omission of car numbers from bills of lading was 
merely a continuation of the practice followed in peacetime. 
Few said, "They billed according to the way they did previous 
to the war. Mll He does not mention a problem which arose before 
that of the lack of numbers on bills of lading, namely, that of 
the delays in receipt of bills of lading_ The Quartermaster-
General contracted all depot quartermasters by telegraph June 2, 
1898, and directed them to forward all bills of lading to the 
quartermaster at the destination without delay.l4 One depot 
quartermaster responded to the telegram, indicating that his 
delays in forwarding bills of lading were due to the rush of 
business. He had, in order to save time, told the civilian 
suppliers to send the Army shipments directly to the railroads 
and then give his office the bills of lading. He explained to 
the Quartermaster-General that this process, while speeding 
shipment, caused delays of up to eight days in forwarding bills 
of lading to the destination. lS 
only four days after directing the immediate forwarding 
of bills of lading, the Quartermaster-General again contacted 
the depot quartermasters, this time about the placing of car 
numbers on bills of lading. 
In order to avoid confusion at destination which now exist~ 
you are hereby directed in making shipments of stores to 
Tampa, Chattanooga, and other points, to forward in ad-
vance to the receiving officers complete invoices and bills 
of lading. The contents of boxes and packages will be 
plainly marked thereon. The numbers and descriptions of 
the cars with copies of waybills will also be forwardedlgs 
soon as they can be obtained from the railroad company. 
However, the orders came too late to help out the situa-
tion at Tampa when the Shafter expedition was embarking on 
June 7. Mr. Pew was questioned on the effects of the rail tie-
up on the troops at Tampa. 
Question. Do you know whether there was any great incon-
venience experienced by the troops on account of lack of 
delivery of these supplies? 
Answer: Yes, sir. There was great inconvenience. Question: Was the.expedition delayed on account of that, 
do you think? 
Answer. No, sir, I do not think it waa. I think they had 
everything they wanted at the time they sailed, because we 
rushed everything down there. We worked night and day.l7 
After locating the necessary supplies, unloading them 
was the next order of business. Few told the Dodge Commission 
that attempts were made to unload the cars on the side tracks 
to get goods. The officer in charge of this phase of the 
operation was Lieutenant J. S. Roudiez, a Regular Army officer. 
He began work on unloading on May 16 or 18, according to Fav. 18 
The commission was not entirely sure that everything had been 
done, and Few was asked if the job could have been done better 
by civilian experts, who would be better equipped to manage 
large quantities of freight over a single track. 
Question: Is it not a fact that where well managed an 
immense amount of buainess can be transacted on a single 
track and one switch? 
Answer: Yea, sir. Question: Do you think you would have been able to handle 
them if properly billed and marked? 
Answer: Yes, sir • • • .19 
Question I Do you suppose if you had here an assiatant 
superintendent of the Pennsylvania Railroad, or one of the 
through lines down here in charge of transportation, 
couldn't he have jerked a good deal of the transportation 
aaide? 
Answer: I do not think that he could have bettered the 
things, OWing to the lack of a side track. 
Question. It was owing to the lack of terminal facilities 
and proper billa of lading? 
Answer. Yes, sir. We made a demand for certain i tams and 
could not find them on account of not having proper car 
numbers. If we had the numbers, we could have gotten the 
stores we wanted. 20 
The problem of car marking had not yet been solved by 
JUly 12, when the Quartermaster-General tel~raphed all shipping 
officers as follows. 
Hereafter pleas. securely fasten to door of each car of 
freight shipped to Tampa or Port Tampa a red card 12 inches 
square, conspicuously marked to show character of contents 
and destination. Por example, "Ordnance stores--Tampa," 
"Commissary Supplies--Port Tampa." Where an agent is sent 
in charge of important shipments he should carry duplicate 
bills of lading with him and be directed to report immedi-
ately to the quartermaster upon arrival at destination. 
Where agents are not sent, duplicate bills should be mailed 
80 as to arrive as aoon as the stores. Acknowledge re-,ceipt.2~ 
This problem was compounded by the limited facilities 
and the lack of transportation facilities such as loading docks, 
and the shortage of transportation equipment. 
• • • in the first place, we did not have the necessary 
transportation at the start. When I came here we only had 
about a dozen private teams, and then Colonel Humphrey--
after a time our regular army tranaporation began to arrive 
and we then had equipment--the wagons and mules came. The 
mules would come one day and then harness another time. 
We had to pick these out as they arrived, and then we got 
out transportation in such shape as to handle the goods. 
starting from the first--that was along about the 15th of 
May that this congestion commenced--that is, we handled the 
material from the 1st of May until about the 12th of Mayas 
it came in, and then along about the 15th we received a 
large number of tents, and, of course, they had no trackage 
here and no terminal facilities. For instance, the 
F. c. & P. only have one line of track, and they would not 
let the cars stay on the track long enough to unload th~~ 
They had to move them to let the regular trains come in. 
It will be noted that one area of equipment which was 
lacking, and which was apparently a cause for some delay was 
that of mules, equipment such as harnesses, and wagons. The 
chief of the Bureau of Transportation in the office of the 
Quartermaster-General was asked about this problem by the Dodge 
Commission. 
Questionz HoW long were you in securing the number of 
wagons as required for the equipment of the Army as it 
was organized and put in the field? 
Answer: We started in at first furnishing what the regi-
ments would actually require in camp. We furnished enough 
for the depot quartermaster and then four for each regi-
ment. It took until well on into Ju13. We supplied the troops ordered to CUba first • • • .2 
As pointed out above, the Regular Army brought their own 
wagons, teams, and harnesses with them. Perhaps this was just 
as well because they represented the total amount of wagons and 
equipment in the Army as of the date of mobilization. 
• • • all the wagons we had at the beginning of the war 
were in the hands of troops at the posts. 
Question: What is the regulation allowance for a regiment? 
Answer4- ... the wagon transportation, 21 to the divi-8ion. 2 
This allowance of wagons would work out to two wagons 
for each regiment of the nine in a division of three brigades. 
Later, this allowance was vastly increased. in an order from 
General Miles, to twenty-five wagons per regiment. The head-
quarters, which had absorbed the three extra wagons in the nine-
regiment division also received an addition of wagon allowance. 
Brigade headquarters now received two wagons, and division head-
quarters four wagons, under the new plan published May 25 by 
General Miles. 2S The Quartermaater-General waa taking action to 
see that wagons, mules, and harnesses were delivered without 
delay. On May 20, he contacted all depot quartermasters by 
telegraph and directed them to speed up shipment of these items. 
Frequent complaints are now reaching this office as to 
unlocked for delays in delivery of mules, wagons, har-
neaaea, etc., shipped from st. Louia and Jeffersonville to 
Chick~au9a and Tampa. You will take this matter up with 
the proper officials of the roads you are using for such 
transportation, and see that any congestion resulting in 
delays is promptly relieved. Prompt delivery i. now easen-
tial to military operations, and must be obtained. If it 
will aid matters in large shipments by you to these points, 
you will send competent and duly authorized man along to 
see that the freight goes through without delay. Give 
this matter immediate attention and report your actions 
by wire. 26 
TWo points mentioned in this telegram betray the urgency 
of affairs at this point. The first is the use of the sentence, 
"Prompt delivery is nOW essential to military operations, and 
must be obtained." This reflects what has been noticed earlier 
in discussions of transportation, the rush element. The second 
point is a peculiarly military one. It refers to the closing 
sentence of the wire, which directs immediate attention and a 
report of actions taken by wire. Immediate attention i. often 
requested in the polite military style of the day, but in the 
military, when an officer of general rank asks for a return 
report on actions taken to correct a situation, it is an indi-
cation that fast action is required. At no other point in the 
available correspondence does the Quartermaster-General use such 
expressions, and it may be concluded that he wanted something 
done in a hurry. The telegram is duplicated in a message to 
COlonel Humphrey, Chief Quartermaster at Tampa, and he is told, 
"You will see that no congestion occurs preventing delivery of 
such freight at the Tampa end of the line ~127 Humphrey was to 
use his own judgement aa to how this was to be accomplished. 
The use of wagons to unload the strings of cars was not 
without its problems, either. Not all locations were usable as 
unloading points. 
Questiona What was the occasion of the congestion, the 
lack of men to unload the cars? 
Answer a No, I don't think it was the fault of the rail-
roads, which were doing all they could. It was simply 
beyond their capacity, they had facilities for handling a 
certain amount of business, and this was way beyond that. 
Question a If they got the cars there, that was all they 
had to do, wasn't it? 
Answer a They could not get them there, that is, where they 
could be unloaded. 
Question: That is, the platform or station facilities were 
not equal to the demand of the business? 
Answer a They could not get the cars in there. They lacked 
facilities in that reapect. They didn't have warehouses, 
and the government didn't have places to unload when you 
got to them. 
Question: Had you land transportation--wagons, mul ~s, and 
transportation of that kind--that would have enabled you to 
unload the cars into wagons and get at the contents of the 
cars? 
Answer: You could not get at cars anywhere on the railroad 
with wagons, you could not get up to them. If you had had 
thousands of teams, you could not have got them. You have 
to get at them at certain places. You could not get at th 
on a grade. 
Question a Of course not, or over a cut, but you don't have 
much of that sort of railroad in Florida? 
Answers You don't have very high embankments, but still 
there are obstacles to prevent unloading into wagons. We 
went several miles out of town, where a wagon road crossed 
the railroad, and we unloaded there. 
Question: Did you have enough men to make crossings 
wherever you pleased--that is, to bring the railroad track 
and the army wagon even? 
Answer a We had men enough, but whether they did the unload 
ing properly is for aomebody else to say. If the men had 
been turned loose .a laborers, they probably could have 
done it. 28 
The whole problem concerning the railroads, loading and 
unloading, and atorage continued throughout the embarkation of 
the Fifth Corps. The movement of troops and equipment to the 
docks at Port Tampa was complicated by the single track of the 
Plant System connecting Tampa and Port Tampa. Not only the 
troops and material of the Fifth Corps, but also train loads of 
sighteers jammed the tracks, increasing the confusion. The 
enterprising Mr. Plant, who was profiting from rail freight into 
Tampa, the single line to Port 'lamp., the Tampa Bay Hotel, and 
ship chartering, waa leaving no stone unturned in his search for 
profits. The Chief Quartermaster of the Fifth Corps, Colonel 
Humphrey, commented on the situation during the embarkation. 
• • • the lack of sufficient facilities of the railroad 
yards and the limited facilities for loading afforded by 
the pier at Port Tampa, and the additional inconvenience 
and hindrance caused by trains running between Tampa and 
the head of the pier and the throngs of people they 
brought. Regularly cars had to be run back to the yards--
one and a half or two miles distant--to be replaced by 
other cars, and a little later these were run back to the 
yard only partially unloaded and replaced by those first 
brought there, to again be returned to same point. 29 
The embarkation had ample room for confusion from the 
standpoint of railroad freight operations alone, and even the 
movement of over 16, 000 men out of Port Tampa, accompanied by 
all of their equipment did not relieve the congestion on the 
railroads. Part of this problem was due to the fact that there 
had been several changes in plan by the War Department. When 
Tampa was selected as the port of embarkation, only a small 
expedition, of perhaps 5,000 men, was planned. 30 Later this 
was expanded, as has been described above, to a force of 70,000 
planned to move from Tampa. 31 Although the plan for 70,000 men 
was changed, no one cancelled the requisition. and movement 
orders for the supplie., and so they came to Tampa. The day 
after the Fifth COrps sailed, the Depot OUartermaster at Tampa 
sent a report to the OUartermaster-General describing what he 
still had to handle in the way of rail shipments. 
Referring to your telegram of the 14th instant regarding 
state of freight at this point, there are 100 cars of the 
Florida Central and Peninsular and 111 of the Plant System 
at this point, and SO cars at Port Tampa remaining to be 
unloaded. There are several hundred cars on sidings north 
of this point. cars are now being unloaded at the rate of 
about 70 per day. The new storage house is approaching 
completion, and portion now under cover is being used for 
storage. If matters proceed a. they are now proceediR9, 
the track will be completely cleared in a week, including 
everything to the north of this place. Have paid no demur-
rage accounts, and recommend that none be paid. The con-
gestion at this point was due as much to the railroad as 
tc the government, and the unloading has often been impeded 
by the railroads not placing the cars when requested to do 
so. Some time ago I took up the subjects of rates and 
freight charges, but have not had time to make a report. 
They charge 2 cents a mile for passengers, and were not 
inclined to make a reduction, though my remarks upon their 
freight and passenger charges were very caustic. They 
claim that there is some arrangement made with the traffic 
and passenger associations which require them to make 
charges. 32 
This is the day after the pressure was taken off, and 
the railroads were still congested to the tune of 261 cars in 
and around the ~ampa area, plus "several hundred" on sidings. 
'lbe entire operation unloading at the rate of seventy cars a 
day was a week behind, and the storage house was not completed. 
Despite heroic efforts, the obstacles to a 8IllOOth flow of aup-
plies had proved to be insurmountable in the amount of time 
available. For the record, during the use of ~ampa as a port 
and railhead from May 18 to August 31, 13,329 freight cars were 
either loaded or unloaded, 9.919 hors •• and mules were issued, 
and 604 wagons were assembled. In addition, 699 wagon. and 
ambulances were repaired, twenty-one pack trains were fitted 
out, and a total of 661 teams were broken in. 33 ~ansportation 
during the pre-embarkation and embarkation phase suffered from 
delays in trackage, storage, and hauling equipment at the start, 
and although improvements were made in all areas, there was not 
enough time for the improvements to take effect on the opera-
tions of the Fifth Corps. Thus, when Shafter's troops sailed 
they experienced difficulty in moving to the dock and loading_ 
The next area to be examined is that of supply. The 
Ouartermaster's Department had a great area of responsibility 
in supply, and many of the men who were critical of the Depart-
ment • s operationa were not aware of the problems it faced. For 
example, one of the moat widely quoted statements concerning the 
logiatics of Tampa is this one of Teddy Roosevelt' a. 
The delays and stupidity of Flagler and the Ordnance 
Department aurpas. belief. The OUartermaster Department 
is better, but bad. The Commissary Department is good. 
There i. no head, no management whatever in the war3R-Part-
menta Against a good nation we should be helpless. 
Haw correct are these statements? Were there delays, 
shortages, and errors? The only way to answer charges like these 
is to take a sampling of the testimony of men directly involved 
with the Departments concerned, such as commissary officers, 
commissary and quartermaster sergeants, mess stewards and ord-
nance officers. 
A good place to start in evaluating the correctness of 
Roosevelt's statement is his awn outfit, the Rough Riders. Major 
H. B. Hersey testified before the Dodge Commiasion on the subject 
of suppliea at Tampa. 
OUestion: Were you abundantly supplied with everything? 
Answer: We were a little short on blankets and some sup-
plies of that nature when we first arrived. They were 
ordered, but were a little slow in arriving. 
Question & Was any special inconvenience suffered on that 
account? 
Answer: No, sir. 35 
In view of what has been said up to this time concerning 
tranaport at Tampa, a delay of some length in receiving items 
should not seem unusual. The lack of supplies was not of such a 
nature as to create an inconvenience, Major Hersey was then 
asked if he knew of any negligence or anything wrong in any 
department. 
Question, If there was anything occurred at Tampa through 
negligence, or if anything went wrong in any department 
under your command, please state it. 
Answer. I don't know of a thinge I found the supply 
departments all right, and that is one of the very impor-
tant features. It was in charge of Major Bellinger, 
quartermaster department. I had regulars encamped on each 
side of me. The Second Cavalry on one side and the Pifth 
on the other, and my relations with the officers of these 
regiments were very pleasant, and they assisted me all they 
could. Qle offered to send me over a quartermaster and 
give my quartermaster instructions as to minute details, 
and in every way I received assistance from regular offi-
cers which enabled me6to take better care of my men than 
if I had been alone. 3 
Testimony of this type tends to prove that far from being 
stupid and incompetent, the supply departments were efficient and 
helpful. However, one case cannot be accepted as proof of over-
all efficiency, as perhaps a look at things from the viewpoint 
of the enlisted man is in order. Quartermaster Sergeant w. w. 
Hill testified that although training in supply duties was neces-
sary, "We had no time to drill them on quartermaster's or commis-
sary's work.·37 This highlights the problem which is common 
among accounts of the Volunteer regiments, namely, inexperience. 
Men were suddenly required to perform duties involving the health 
and comfort of their fellows without being trained for these 
duties. The only check on these men was provided by the incor-
rect performance of their duties, which resulted in discomfort 
or disease for their comrades. 
The problems of the Quartermaster's Department at Tampa 
are tied directly to the railroad problem. General Nelson Miles, 
who waa on the scene, reported these problems vividly in a series 
of t.1eqra~s to the Secretary of War I 
To illustrate the embarrassment caused by present condi-
tions, 15 cars loaded with uniforms were side-tracked 25 
miles away from Tampa., and remained there for weeks while 
the troops were suffering for clothing. 38 
Several of the volunteer regiments came here without uni-
formsl • j • and some without blankets, tents, or camp 
equipage. 9 
Both of these telegrams were sent on JUne 4, with the 
_xpedi tion for Cuba in its final stages of preparation. The 
ahortages were due to the railroad tie-up, not to the failure of 
the Quartermaster's Department to send enough supplies. A regu-
lar army brigade commissary, who was also acting quartermaster, 
testified that he was able to draw transport, aome tentage, and 
aome clothing without delay, and that he was, in general, well 
supplied. His only areas of complaint were in relation to delays 
in wagons and harness, and the unavai lability of certain items 
and sizes of clOthing.40 A point of interest which runs through 
all of the testimony relating to the Quartermaster's Department 
is that, on the average, the Department is not accused of fail-
ing to supply the items wanted, but ia inatead charged with fail-
ure to deliver them faat enough. Many of the units who were not 
destined for the CUba expedition felt the supply pinch, since 
priority was given to outfitting the Fifth Corps. The COmmand-
ing Officer of the 1st Ohio Volunteers makes mention of the fact 
that quartermaster supplies were short, and hie supply officer. 
were told that issues to the Fifth Corps took priority over those 
to other units.4l 
The Ordnance Department suffered from the transportation 
snarl, too. The Chief of Ordnance related generally what had 
happened. 
Now when I got complaints that troops did not receive their 
arms or had not received their equipment, it was uniformly 
[sic] the case that I had not received any requisition for 
them. At firat, these requisitions did not come to the 
ordnance officer, but they were sent to the arsenal direct, 
at the same time, I understood that the transportation 
became swamped, that stores were there in cars and could 
not be found, and then were not delivered to the officers, 
and then again, I found, as I stated before, that arms that 
did arrive were taken and turned over to others and the 
Ordnance Department never informed of the fact, or of the 
fact that troops had already received their arms and had 
them taken away. 42 
The swamped transportation delayed all types of ordnance 
stores, including both small arms and artillery. For example, 
General Miles noted on June 4 If ••• five thousand rifles which 
were discovered yesterday were needed by several regiments. 
Also the different parts of the siege train and ammunition for 
the same, which will be required immediately on landing, are 
scattered through hundreds of cars on the side tracks of the 
railroads ... 43 Lieutenant Colonel J. D. Miley also noted the 
problems of ordnance stores for the artillery. 
The siege artillery and the ammunition had come in from 
different arsenals and at different times, and much delay 
arose in gathering all of the parts and mounting the guns 
on the carriages • • • it was deemed necessary to mount 
the guns before placing them on the transports, and the 44 
artillery troops worked night and day to hasten the work. 
Because of this railroad problem, regiments were without 
1-________ , ____ .!_.,,_. ___ .......... QIi8I~JIIllIIlJlllllO'_I.Y __ • _____________ --' 
weapons, and as a result, could not carry out training. Miles 
noted that M. 0 • several [regiments] came without arms ••• The 
32nd Michigan, which is one of the best, came without arms. 
General Guy V. Henry reports that five regiments of his command 
are not fit to go into the field."45 And again, a little later, 
Miles states that "Between 30 and 40 percent are undrilled in 
the manual of arms with weapons, and in one regiment over 300 
men have never fired a gun.-46 
However, not all of the problem was due to the railroad 
snarl. The Ordnance Department was still a month behind in their 
production of troops' equipment, and was unable to obtain suit-
able substitutes in the commercial market. For example, the 
standard woven cartridge belt was only made by one company, which 
held the patent on its design. other firms would have to tool up 
to produce this item, and so substitutes were sought. What 
appeared to be a suitable item was procured and sent to Tampa, 
but the troops refused it, aince it was not of standard design. 
The item later proved to be unserviceable, and few were issued. 
The ties of logistics to the combat arms in action are 
often unrealized or at least unnoticed. Yet a logistical problem 
which was not solved became a matter of life or death to the men 
of the Seventy-First New York, one of the two volunteer infantry 
regiments sent to CUba with the Fifth Corps. The regiment went 
to CUba with the old .45 caliber Springfield rifles, for which 
only black-powder cartridges were available. The first time they 
went into action, their first shots disclosed their position to 
the enemy, and they were pinned down and suffered many casual-
ties. The inability of the Ordnance Department to get smokeless 
powder cartridges produced, or to get Krag-Jorgensen .30 caliber 
rifles issued cost men their lives. The Krags were available, 
because the Rough Riders got them, but then the Seventy-First 
did not have a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy as its 
regimental executive officer. 
The COMmissary-General of Subsistence had been busy, 
shipping supplies into Tampa, and contracting with local sup-
pliers for various items. Between May 20 and June 16, six . 
contracts were let to contractors for fresh meat for the camps. 
The contractors were required to post a bond, covering their 
activities during the period of the contract, July 1 to Decem-
ber 31. The contracts were for fresh beef, and in one case, 
fresh mutton. The government paid between 10 and 12.5 cents a 
pound for the earlier supplies, but as competition became more 
intense, the price went down to 7.2 cents, then 7.1, and finally 
6.9 cents a pound.47 
Unlike the property of the other technical service 
departments, that of the Subsistence Department deteriorated 
when kept too long in storage. The Commissary-General reacted 
quickly to the news of a freight tie-up. 
I underAtood there was difficulty in 7ampa with regard to 
the loading, and when I learned it I t~legraphed to the 
Commissary to ascertain what was to be done, and I told 
them to Pilfer charges against the quartermaster if he was 
to blame. 
The orders for my department were to throw ninety days 8 
supplies for 70,000 men into Tampa. These orders ••• were 
given a few days before my appointment as Commissary-
General. We threw the bacon in there. The congestion 
occurred. I was appalled. We had no storehouse for the 
Subsistence Department. I sent telegrams to the depot 
commissary, Colonel Smith, to hire laborers, and unload 
those cars at any cost. • .General Shafter went 11ay with 
16,000 men. They carried four months' supplies. 
~ne Commissary-General soon became convinced that, if he 
were to do his job efficiently, he should control the shipment 
of sUbsistence supplies as well as their procurement. He de-
scribes in his testimony before the Dodge Commission, how he had 
to explain to a foreign military attache that subsistence sup-
plies changed hands from four to six times during shipment, 
dependent upon how far they were to be sent. At another point, 
he describes his request for two ships to send SUbsistence 
supplies, and the refusal of the Quartermaster-Goneral to allow 
the use of these two ships for that purpose. SO 
Once the supplies reached the depot commissary at Tampa, 
they seem to have been handled in a fairly organized and 
efficient manner. There were, as one officer described it, u. _ 
• a few little irritating delays, from the inexperience of new 
staff officers ••• in the quartermaster's and commissary'. 
both. uSl There did seem to be a problem of sorts with regard 
to food spoilage. One of the assistant commissaries commented 
that, " ••• a good many of our supplies have been on hand as 
long as four or five months, and are not as fresh as they might 
be.-S2 He added that there was - ••• only one complaint at 
Tampa, mnd that was of the bacon.-S3 One of the men who was 
drawing supplies from the commissary said there was " ••• some 
little trouble at Tampa about potatoes and onions, but that coulo 
not be helped, it was the hot weather, and they were shipped on 
too long transit to be good when they camee n54 The railroad tie-
up again involves another department in difficulty because of 
freight delays. 
The business of drawing from the SUbsistence Department 
for feeding the troops was fairly complex. The number of days 
for which rations were to be drawn was at the discretion of the 
commanding officer. 
They are supposed to draw seven days of fresh and three of 
salt rationsl that, however, is not obligatory on the com-
pany_ The commanding officer can have eight or ten days 
rations issued. The number of days is discretionary with 
the commanding officer. The usage, in thesgiscretion of 
the Commanding General, is seven to three. 
The Commanding General set the relation of fresh to salt 
rations, and the Army ration list set the composition of the 
rations. Speaking of food complaints, one company commissary 
sergeant said that the men were used to better fare, and disliked 
the Army food, but that he could do nothing about it since the 
company sergeant had nothing to say on the composition of the 
rations. His efforts to get variety in the rations given to his 
men by substituting additional rice for the beans were unsuc-
cessful. His regimental commissary officer told him it could 
not be done. S6 
Vast quantities of food were flowing into Tampa, and the 
Quarte~aster-General asked the Commissary-General to stop send-
ing supplies. 
The issuing and care of the rations was an area in which 
problems seemed to arise constantly. One depot commissary 
officer remarked that the brigade and regimental commissaries 
tried to take care of the food, but that there seemed to be a 
lack of discipline, and his instructions on care of the rations 
were either forgot.ten or ignored. He said that there was no 
evidence of training on the part of the commanders of lower units 
to insure that the commissary people knew their jobs. 57 One 
company commissary sergeant described his duties as drawing 
rations for ten days, taking care of them, and overseeing cook-
ing. This particular non-commissioned officer consulted with 
his company commander on the meals to be served to the men, 
which was unusual at the time. 58 The fresh beef appeared to 
have often been an unsatisfactory item since several of the 
commissary people mention it in their testimony. A regimental 
commissary said there were no problems in the commissary area 
except for the beef, which his unit returned to the brigade 
commissary, and got hams for use instead. He said that the 
regular ration was enough if the company commissary sergeant 
took care of it. In some cases, though, all the care possible 
was not sufficient. 
We found cases • • • where it was alleged that the beef had 
been i.ssued in the morning and bS90re it could be cooked for dinner it was found tainted. 
The act.ion which should have been taken in this case is 
that which was described above, namely that of returning the beef 
to the commissary and exchanging it for other suitable food. 
The Commissary-General said that such occurrences were due to 
long storage during shipment, exposure to the sun during trans-
fer from one point to another, and poor care of the meat during 
the transfer. He stated that if a latent taint existed in the 
meat as issued, the unit was not to blame. He cited a number of 
cases where bad meat had been returned to the contractor, and 
good meat required to be substituted.60 
The Subsistence Department kept close supervision over 
the supply of food by contractors. The issue of potatoes and 
onions was a good example of this supervision. To save t~e and 
handling, issues were made from the railroad cars at the ware-
houae to unit commissaries. Upon presentation of an order from 
the Subsistence Department, the commissaries could draw potatoes 
and onions from the railroad cars. An officer of the SUbsis-
tence Department supervised the whole transaction, weighing 
each sack, and tabulating the difference over or short of the 
amount contracted for. After the issue was completed, any 
amount short was required to be added to the issue on the spot.6~ 
Any items found to be unusable could be exchanged at once. 
The attitude of the voluntesrs toward Army food is per-
haps best expressed by one private, who said, "They have never 
been away from home, and they think they are going to have 
coffee like their mother made. "62 The Commissary-General, not 
surprisingly, felt that the Army was, as a whole, well fed. In 
preparing for the operation of Tampa, he had sent a depot com-
mis8ary there over and above the allowance authorized by 
regulations. In addition, General Shafter had a commissary 
officer on his staff to handle problems in this area. The 
quantity of food was adequate, and the quality about average, 
but the poor preparation created waste. The fact that the 
Quartermaster's Department had oharge of shipping is probably 
responsible for the lack of cooking devices on board ship. The 
men were issued travel rations, but, "In the haste under which 
the santiago expedition left Tampa, proper provisions for cook-
ing the food of the men in the transports seems to have been 
either neglected or impossible.H63 The American soldier was not 
to be deprived of his food, however, and he managed to rig up 
numerous odd devices to heat the rations. One volunteer regi-
ment • a cooks ". • • dumped the required number of cans of corned 
beef into a wash boiler, broke some hardtack into it, and then, 
on deck, turned a steampipe from the engine room into it ... 64 
One of the logistical weaknesses of the commissary 
operations at Tampa wa* the lack of regimental commissary offi-
cers and sergeants. In the companies, the work of the commissary 
was done as an additional duty of the quartermaster sergeant. 
This meant that there were no full time commissaries below the 
brigade level. With the best intentions in the world, men 
assigned to two duties could not do justice to both, and the 
additional duty of commissary work was usually the one that 
suffered. 
The Medical Department like all of the other technical 
service departments, suffered because of the railroad operations 
at Tampa. The Surgeon-General said, 
There were temporary delays in the arrival of supplies at 
••• Tampa, Florida, for General Shafter's Army, but they 
were in all cases due to defective transportation facili-
ties, and not to the want of foresight or prompt at~!ntion 
to requisitions on the part of the Surgeon-General. 
The facilities for medieal care were begun at Tampa 
around May 4, when Major A. H. Appel, a surgeon, was directed 
by the Medical Department to establish a hospital for the troops 
of the Fifth Corps. Major Appel had several sources of supply 
in setting up his operation. First, there were the supply 
facilities of the Medical and Quartermaster's Departments. 
These facilities supplied tentage, hospital bedding, litters, 
horses, mules, wagons, and medicine. In addition, an order from 
the SUrgeon-General's office had broken up the regimental hospi-
tals, and all of their supplies were transferred to Major Appel's 
hospital. This order was not well liked in the volunteer ArmY, 
because many of the regiments had elaborate hospitals and felt 
that they could care for their men better than another medical 
facility. Finally, the Major was given authority to purchase 
medicine and supplies from local suppliers. He made use of all 
of these sources of supplies, drawing plenty of tentage from the 
Quartermaster's Department, as well as six ambulances and six 
escort wagons, and forty-eight mules. His operation was well 
stocked with medicine, both from the regimental hospitals and 
the local supplier •• 66 He also had available the medical supply 
depot, which the Department had established at Tampa to handle 
the issue of medical supplies to the Army. 
The supply depot was not always able to supply the 
demands made upon it by medical officers, particularly those of 
volunteer regiments. The problem lay in the fact that the only 
medicines which the depot could stock for issue were those which 
the Army had gotten around to approving. Naturally, the volun-
teer surgeons, many of whom had been appointed directly from 
civilian life, wanted to use the latest medicines, and the depot 
often did not have these, and could not get them for the sur-
geons. 
The surgeons were not always well informed as to the 
mechanics of requisitioning, either. The Surgeon-General point-
ed out that 
• • • difficulty has arisen, no doubt, from the ignorance 
of volunteer medical officers of the proper mode of making 
requisition for medical supplies, and because they did not 
always take the trouble to inform themselves or to consult 
the manuals and regulations, which were freely distributed~7 
The purchasing of the additional supplies on the local 
market did not constitute any great difficulty. Major Appel 
said that there were several drug stores in Tampa, which were 
able to supply all of his needs. Captain C. C. McCUlloch, the 
officer conunanding the hospital in West Tampa, said "The medical 
depot would not have supplies we needed on hand, but we would 
buy them. It 68 
Food for the patients in hospitals does not seem to have 
been much of a problem. Captain MCCUlloch was interviewed in 
August, just after the troops had been ordered north and he said 
that he had remaining from SUbsistence funds Meleven hundred 
dollars that I ••• turned back to the Commissary Department. M69 
B¥ the time the embarkation for CUba began, the Medical 
Department facilities at Tampa were in condition for active 
service. There were shortages in ambulances, wagons, horses, 
and harnesses, and the ambulance corps was not up to its author-
ized strength in men, but medical supplies and equipment for 
treatment of wounded were adequate. 70 
Closely related to the medical aspects of the use of 
Tampa is the consideration of troop housing. Colonel Anderson, 
the native of Tampa who testified before the Dodge Commission on 
the climate and living conditions of the area, had stated that 
the first troops put into the area were placed on high ground, 
but that the units which arrived later were put into low ground, 
Which was suitable for use until the rainy season began. The 
official report of the Dodge Commission said, 
Most of the men were encamped in healthful locations, but 
some of them on ground so low that when the rainy season 
commenced much discomfort was experienced. The water 
supply was ample and good, being obtained from the works 
of the Plant System, which was (sic) extended into the 
camps of the various organizations. • • The excessive 
heat of the summer caused considerable discomfort to the 
troops and live stock, and the order for transfer to 71 
Montauk Point the first part of August was very welcome. 
During the period that Tampa was used as a point of con-
centration and a port of embarkation, it was occupied by 48,072 
troops of both the volunteer and Reqular Army. Virtually the 
entire Regular Army was at Tampa, according to the official 
figures of 27,602 Regulars. In addition, some 20,470 Volunteers 
were at Tampa during the period of its use. It is important 
to note t.hat all of the troops enumerated above' were not at 
'tampa at the same time. On June 20, six days after Shafter's 
force sailed, there were 19,322 men at Tampa, and by July 20, 
this figure had increased to 25,306. 72 
The period of occupation by the troops of the Fifth 
Corps began with the arrival of the Regular Army units in the 
early part of May, and terminated with its departure on June 14. 
The Regulars were accustomed to setting up camp, and soon had 
made themselves comfortable. The volunteer units sent to join 
them were supposed to be the best of those available at Chicka-
Inauga, and they also seem to have gotten along fairly well. 
The period of difficulty began with the departure of the 
Fifth Corps, and the arrival of many more volunteers. The units 
which moved in set up camp in the low ground vacated by some of 
the units of the Fifth Corps .. and built themselves shacks with 
boards "scrounged" from the local area. This was not a bad idea .. 
really, until the rains came. Then the shacks became a breed-
ing place for infection, due to the low ground, which collected 
water into stagnant pools, and the general ignorance of sani-
tary practices prevailing among the volunteers. Worse yet, when 
a move to higher ground was suggested, the units did not want to 
leave their shacks for tents, and refused to move. This created 
a large amount of disease, which kept the medical facilities 
full. 
~le best commentary on the reasons for the problems 
described comes from the Dodge Commission, which investigated 
the camp at Tampa,as well as all of the other camps used during 
the war. 
• • • it may be said that it is impossible to bring together 
a regiment of 1,300 men who'se lives and habits have all 
been different and place them in camp, subject them to its 
discipline, diet, and duties, without much complaint. They 
must bpcome acclimated and accustomed to camp life before 
sickness can be prevented •••• The imprudent acts of the 
soldie,! are the first and greatest cause of sickness in 
camps. 
Fortunately for the health of the men, the occupation of 
the camps did not last long enough for any problems of epidemic 
proportions to develop. At CUlp Thomas, the volunteer units 
were ravaged by disea.e caused by conditions such as have been 
described at Tampa, allowed to continue for three or four months. 
The embarkation phase of the operation can be properly 
said to have begun with the embarkation of the Fifth COrps, and 
terminated with the laat use of Tampa as a logistical base. 
This use of Tampa continued into the fall of 1898, but the major 
part of the logistical operations was carried out during the 
summer months. In add! 'tion to the shipment of the elements of 
the Fifth Corps, the base at Tampa .ent out ships with logisti-
cal supplies for the force in Cuba, and received and cared for 
the sick who were sent back. By the time the base was abandoned, 
the operations were being carried out smoothly, with no back-up 
of equipment or delay in supply issue. 
The embarkation and movement of the Fifth Corps to CUba 
was ordered by telegraph on May 31. The order specified the 
units to be taken in the most general terms, telling Qeneral 
Shafter only to "take your command aboard transports"74 and move 
to CUba. This order had been preceded by a series of messages 
from the Commanding General of the Army, which were not too 
specific. 
On May 26, Shafter was told to be "prepared to take 
25,000 men" for the expedition. Three days later, this figure 
had evaporated, and he was told to take "your most effective 
force of regulars and volunteers." The next day, this was made 
a little more specific by directing the movement of "an effective 
force of infantry and artillery, both regular and volunteer".75 
The final composition of the expedition is described by 
a piece of official correspondence which gives the total 
strength figures. 
By telegraphic orders of May 31, General Shafter was 
directed to proceed with his command on transports to the 
vicinity of Santiago de CUba, and, on June 8, preparatory 
to departure, the transports were loaded with the following 
troops. First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth, 'l'enth, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Sixteenth, 
Seventeenth, Twentieth, Twenty-first, Twenty-second, and 
Twenty-fourth regiments of infantry, two dismounted squad-
rons of four troops each from the First, Third, Sixth, 
Ninth and Tenth o. s. cavalry and First U. s. Volunteer 
cavalry, one squadron Second cavalry, light batteries E 
and K, Firat Artillery, A and F, Second Artillery, Heavy 
batteries G and H, Fourth Artillery, Companies C and E, 
Engineers, Seventy-Firat New York and Second Massachusetts, 
making a grand6total of ••• 815 officers and 16,072 
enlisted men. 7 
In preparation for the embarkation, the Quartermaate4-
General asked for a report on the status of shipping, and the 
carrying capacity of the vessels on hand. Colonel Humphrey 
telegraphed the following reply on May 20th, no doubt after 
conferring with Captain McRay, his civilian shipping conSUltant. 
Your telegram of the 19th, regarding carrying capacity of 
transports chartered, so far as known to this office, at 
Port Tampa are San Marcos, Comal. Alamo, Gussie, Whitney, 
Florida, Olivette. Allbih'ji' Berkshire, D. H. Miller, at 
New Orleans, the Oriza~. _eakwater, Stillwater. Arkansa., 
and Morgan' at Mobile, Mlt'tteawan and Fanital not yet re-
ceived here, Concho, Rio Glande. Leona. Vigilancia. 
Sequranca. YUcatan' Senec" Saratoga, Santiago. City of 
washIngton. Manteo. Cherokee, Iroquois and Miami. Captain 
McKay, who knows all these vessels, states they will carry 
24,900 men, 1,406 horses and 90 mules. All ships at Port 
Tampa are fitted out with stalls and bunks, so far as 
practicable. The Qrizaba was fi tted out with same before 
she was sent to New Orleans. The other ships will be put 
in order for men and animals as fa8t a8 they arrive. Have 
material ready. Presume your intention is to fit up all 
vessels not yet arrived to carry as many animals as practi-
~:~~e~es~lY~~rW::im~k:sf~~d::~P~~ri~h~:: ~C~e!:~;7in 
This telegram gives a hint as to where the Commanding 
General got the figure of 25,000 men quoted to General Shafter 
in his wire of May 26th. The Quartermaster-General gave more 
detailed instructions, including some from General Miles, the 
Commanding General. 
• •• Your telegram regarding the carrying capacity of 
these ships, according to Captain McRay's estimate, is a 
little disappointing, as I hoped the vessels would carry 
at least 30,000 men, infantry and artillery, with the 
artillery horses. I understand that only one regiment of 
cavalry is to go, and the Arkansas. Morgan. Breakwater. and 
Stillwater have been fitted to carry that regiment, and 
reported by General Scully [quartermaster at New Orleans] 
as all ready. He reports that the oeizaba is only fitted 
to carry 350 men. He has been directed to fit her up to 
carry as many infantry men as can be conveniently put upon 
her. 
General Miles desires that all the vessels that arrive 
in Tampa that are not fitted to carry troops, and were 
heretofore arranged for ho~ses, should have temporary bunks 
put up in the pens for stock, 80 that the largest number of 
infantry and artillery P9ftaible can be taken over on the 
first trip of the ships. 
The problem of railroad lines and congestion of freight 
has already been discussed. The single line running from Tampa 
to Port Tmnpa, supplemented by whatever transportation could be 
found would be the means of moving the troops and their equip-
ment onto the dock at Port Tampa. The Army had laid down addi-
tional track on the dock itself, so that cars could be spotted 
and loaded or unloaded from the ships. 
The harbor at Port Tampa had a canal about half a mile 
long, which was used for the loading of ships. One expert later 
testified that the facilities were ~dequate for the loading of 
twenty-four or twenty-five vessels with troops only and twelve 
or thirteen with equipment only. During the embarkation, the 
facilities were used for twelve or thirteen vessels which were 
loaded with both troops and equipment. 79 
The pressure to sail had been building all through May, 
with politicians wnnting immediate action at any cost. By 
June 4, communications were arriving from Washington hourly for 
both Shafter and Miles, who had come down to Tampa to oversee 
things in person. Shafter responded to one telegram with the 
statement, "Difficulties in loading cannot be appreciated," 
While IUles still si:ruck an opt:imistic note, saying, "Notwith-
standing these difficulties, this expedition will soon be ready 
to s8il."80 HOwever, by JUne 6, the people in Washington were 
re&ching the breaking point, and Secretary of War Alger tele-
graphed that 
Twenty thousand men ought to unload any number of cars and 
assort contents. There is much criticism about delay of 
expedition. Better leave a fast sbip to bring balance of 
material needed than delay longer. 
However, by this time General Shafter was able to report, 
though not correctly, that the men were being loaded. Actually 
the loading did not begin until early in the morning of Tuesday, 
JUne 7th. 
Most of the secondary works available on the War state 
that there was no plan devised for the loading at Tampa, that 
regiments were simply told to go to the pier and get on the first 
ship they saw, etc. In fact., there was a plan which was de-
scribed to the Dodge Commission: 
Question. • • as to troops, were the vessel upon Which the 
several organizations were to embark indicated and the name 
furnished to these severa) organizations, or did they go 
ahead en masse? 
Answer: It was indicated what vessels they should go on, 
and the commanding 6§ficers had orders what vessels they 
were to take. • • • 
The evolution of this plan was also described to the 
commission by Captain .McKay. He had made an estimate of the 
number of troops each ves.el would hold, and had forwarded this 
estimate to Colonel Humphrey, who took it to General Shafter. 
Shafter then issued orders to the commanders of the individual 
units. It may be that not all organizations received the orders 
issued by Shafter, and this may be the point at which control of 
the embarkation was lost. But the fact remains that the plan 
was made, and orders is.ued.84 
One of the men who contributed to the story about the 
lack of plans for the embarkation was Lieutenant Colonel J. W. 
Jacobs, who had been involved in the inspection of the trans-
ports. 
Question: It was a sort of a haphazard operation? 
Answer: I should say so, very decidedly, air. 
Question: Had the transports on which the troops embarked 
been previously inspected? 
Answer: Yes, air, by General Lawton, Colonel Dorst, and 
myself, we made one inspection. 
Queetion: Were the transports, so far aa you know, sui t-
able for the carrying of troops on such an expedition? 
Answer: Yes, they were very good. 
Question I What was the condition of them as to crowding? 
Everything was carried that it could carry, I suppose. 
Answer: I don't think there was any particular oveigrowd-
ing, considering the ahort distance they had to go. 
Jacob's testimony elicited a furious telegram to the 
Adjutant-General from Colonel Humphrey, then serving in CUba 
with the Fifth Corps. He gives some more details on the opera-
tion of the plan of embarkation. 
Jacob's evidence before commis8ion, if reported correctly 
that embarkation of troops at Port '!'ampa was haphazard, 
shows grossest ignorance or premeditated mi8representation. 
My pencil memoranda made then and there shows that the 
loading was done with deliberate care, General Shafter 
having given me timely information of theagrder in which 
organizations broke camp for embarkation. 
EVen Jacobs had to admit, however, that Colonel Humphrey 
was in personal charge of the loading might and day. captain 
McKay, who was acting as Humphrey' s assistant, gave more details 
on the ~ole of the activities during the loading. 
Question I To What extent did you have charge of the load-
ing of transports at Port Tampa? 
Answers Well, I had the superintending of the loading of 
stores--of the commissary stores, quartermaater stores, 
wagons, mules, and artillery. 
Question: In general, how were the stores loaded? Did eacll 
transport go with a certain number of rations--or did you 
put the bacon in one ship and the hardtack in another, and 
the beef in another, etc? 
Answer: Nearly every ship was loaded with the complete 
rations. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Question: • • • were the ships overloaded? 
Answer I • • • most of the Slhips had what they could com-
fortably carry, but I think there were five that were a 
little overcrowded and a number were taken off and put on 
others that were not crowded. 
• •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Question: Do you know. • • how the medical and quarter-
master stores were loaded, were they loaded so that each 
vessel's troops would have the supply of medical and 
quartermaster's stores and commissary stores that they 
would need when the landed? 
Answer I 'l'hat is my impression. I don't think there was 
an overabundance of medical stores aboard. I doubt if 
there was any supply of medical atores outside of these 
panniers to the best of my recollection. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
ouestion: • • • were the vessels comfortably fixed for the 
transportation of the troops, had special efforts been made 
to make them so? 
Answer: Yes, sir, for the limited time they had. 'l'here 
was a great hurry to get the expedition off. Every day--
two or three times a day--a telegram would come for me 
from Colonel Humphrey to hurry up m6tters as quickly aa 
possible. If we hag7had more time, we probably could have 
made things better. 
It is a measure of the task facing the historian to com-
pare the above teat.imony, made by a man who was present, with 
what will follow, also testified t.o by men who were present. 
Colonel Jacobs agrees with captain McKay on the fact that rations 
were loaded on each vessel. However, he states that the artil-
lery ammunition, guns, and other gear were loaded on different 
ships, and medical supplies were not loaded throughout the fleet. 
According to his testimony, no medical supplies were sent by 
order of Colonel Humphrey, and no ambulances by order of General 
Shafter. 
COlonel Jacobs' statements regarding medical supplies 
are supported by the testimony of Major valery Havard, the Chief 
Surgeon of the cavalry Division of the Fifth Corps. Major Havard 
stated that he had brought enough supplies for two weeks opera-
tions, but complained that no ambulances were taken and that the 
medical stores were scattered among the transports. He said, 
MX believe the transports were not properly loaded in the first 
place,MSS He recommended that in fu~ure operations, medical 
supplies be loaded separately from those of the Quartermaster's 
Department. 
The problom, clreadl· confused, gets more so when the 
statements of Major A. H. Appel, the officer in charge of the 
hospital at Tampa, are considered. He stated that he loaded 
enough medical supplies on one shi~, the Olivette. for a 200-
bed hospital. In addition, he says he loaded six ambulances and 
six escort wagons with their accompanying mule teams, as well. 89 
About all that can be deduced about medical supplies is 
that there were shortages which should not have existed. The 
SUrgeon-General stated, "When the command embarked on the trans-
port vessels, the baggage wagons and mules were left behind and 
were never seen again by the Medical Department of the Fifth 
Army Corps ... 90 
The fact of great confusion on the docks at Port Tampa 
has been recorded by history. Whether it was due to poor plan-
ning on the part of Shafter and Humphrey, or whether they would 
have done better if better organized to meet the problems, 
cannot be said with certainty. The results which flowed from 
that embarkation were far-reaching, indeed. When the whole 
problem has been considered, the words of Secretary Alger still 
have a certain measure of authority. 
And, yet, notwithstanding the natural and inherent embar-
rassments attending the organizing, equipping and 9mbarka-
tion of that Army, General Shafter was r~!dy to sail within 
eight days after he received his orders. 
CHAPTER V 
COMMENTARY-RESULTS FLOWING 
FROM THE EMBARKATION 
Between May 18 and August 31, the port at Tampa and its 
facilities had accomplished the following work: 
Funds Disbursed •••••••••••• $1,057,582.46 
Army Corps equipped •••••••••••••••• 2 
Freight cars handled (loaded or unloaded) •• 13,329 
Officers and men transported • • • • • • 66,478 
Horses anc r·1ules transported • • • • • • 15,306 
Transportation requests issued. • • • • •• 1,610 
Bills of lading issued • • • • • • • • ••• 815 
Horses and Mules received •••••••••• 11,389 
Horses and Mules issued. • • • • • • • • .9,919 
Wagons "set up" ••••••••••••••••• 604 
Teams "broken out H (6 miles) • • • • • • • .141 
Teams "broken out" (4 miles) •••••••••• 520 
Pack trains equipped • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 21 
~'lagons and ambulances repaired • • • • • • • • .699 
Trannporta fitted out. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 331 
Transports cleared • • • • • • • • • • • 78 
In the process of doing all of these things, the men 
operating the facilities stirred up a let of comment and contro-
versy, both among themselves and in the press. For example, the 
Commissary-General of Subsistence thought that " •• .the Subsis-
tence Department should purchase the food, convey it, and hand 
it to the soldiers. I do not thlnk in this country there will 
be proper service until that is done.- 2 
The Medical Department was also unhappy, particularly a-
bout the shipment of its supplies. The Dodge Commission stated 
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that " ••• no small part of the troubles consequent upon lack of 
supplies was due to the slowness with which such supplies were 
transported and the failure to properly deliver, the responsibil-
i ty for which rests upon the Quartermaster's Department." 3 
The press was alive with criticism of the Tampa ernbarka-
tion, and the Army's inability to handle it in an orderly fash-
ion. Cries were heard on every side for all investigation so 
that these mistakes might not be repeated. The Dodge COllUllission 
was the result of these and other complaints concerning the War 
Department. Its investigation was thorough, and when it got 
through, it 'Saio, among oth~r things, that, 
••• the divided authority and responsibility in the War 
Departnumt has produced friction, for which in the inter-
est of the service, a remedy, if possible, should be ap-
plied. 4 
A foreign officer pointed out the weaknesses of the op-
ation, and said " ••• a trained staff and officers could not be 
improvised." He felt that" .the whole operation of embar-
kation at Tampa is full of lessons for our guidance.· S 
A later writer felt that the solution to the problem 
would have been a general staff. His comment was, ·We are not 
going to make any comments on the disorder and lack of organiza-
tion, but we can safely say that with even a mediocre general 
staff all this could have been avoided.· 6 
The Dodge Commission report gives the other side of the 
story, with a certain degree of compassion, recognizing that 
planning was all that could be done by department heads. 
The commission has refrained from criticizing certain of 
the heads of bureaus for not having acted with foresight 
in preparing their various departments for active war be-
fore war was actually declared, because it has appeared 
that the national defense fund provided by the act of 
March 9, 1898, was not made available for use, except by 
the Navy and for coast defenses and the expenditures in-
cident thereto, until after the declaration of war. 7 
In particular, the Quartennaster's Department's problems 
were recognized and comment made regarding them. 
It will be observed that the declaration of war threw 
upon the Quartermaster's Department an amount of labor and re-
sponsibility for which it was neither physically nor financially 
prepared. 8 
What were the recommended solutions? How were the prob-
lems which arose during the use of Tampa going to be solved? 
The answer to both of these questions lies in a single word--
change. 
The Dodge Commission, having made a thorough investiga-
tion, had a good idea of the problems existing and the possible 
changes which could be made. One of the suggestions advanced 
was that included in a small section entitled"Army Administra-
tion" in the last volume of the report. It was advanced by a 
Civil War veteran, Charles F. Benjamin, who had served on the 
staff of Secretary Stanton. Benjamin suggested that the general 
staff be made open to the line of the Army, that is, to men not 
members of the Technical Service Departments. The only excep-
tion to this "open door" policy would be assignments to the En-
gineer, Signal and Medical Departments, each of which was 
supposed to be so technical that special qualifications or train-
ing would be required. In addition, he recommended that the En-
gineer and Signal Departments be consolidated, and that the 
Quartermaster, Subsistence and Paymaster Departments be consoli-
dated. Finally, he said that the general staff should be placed 
under the control of a chief of staff, rather than the then ex-
tant Commanding General, which office he described as "neither 
fish nor fowl ng 
A direct tie from the Tampa embarkation to the idea of a 
general staff is established by the Dodge Conwission. In dis-
cussing the lessons to be learned from the expedition, the com-
missions report states that one of them is that a strategic 
staff is needed. In sum, "There must be a central staff system 
for futher conflicts, a logical and rapidly expanded network of 
supply, • and centralized a~thority."lO 
The need for a strategic staff was echoed by the annual 
report of th.e Secretary of War for 1898. The Inspector General 
stated that: 
The great need in the Army to insure coherence, prompt-
ness, and efficiency in the field is a strategic staff, 
composed of highly trained and trustworthy offices, such 
as possessed by all continental armies, who, free from 
the overwhelming details of paper work, can give their 
wldivided attention to the systematic preparation and 
execution of all important military affairs. Such a 
staff would permit no symptom of chaos, hold all to their 
full and proper work, and mold the organized forces and 
control their movement so they would respond to the 
slightest touch.ll 
There are definite relations to the Tampa embarkation to 
be seen here, too. Remarks like hfree from the overwhelming de-
tails of paper work" and "control their movement" show a preoc-
cupation with the simplification of staff work in the departments 
particularly the Quartermaster's Department. An influence which 
will be of later significance is seen in the reference to the 
general staffs of the continental armies. 
The Inspector General was not without opposition in his 
recommendations. In the same report, only a few pages later, 
the Adjutant General says that " ••• it is doubtful, if ••• a 
general reorganization of the staff, or the adoption of new sys-
tems, will be fo~nd to be desirable, certainly nothing radical 
should be entered upon •••• 12 An indication of the innate 
conservatism of army bureaucrats is shown by the passage follow-
ing the above quote, which says in effect, that if the staff 
system was good enough for the Civil War, it is good enough for 
1898. The whole passage seems to show an ignorance of the prob-
lems which were part of the embarkation at Tampa. Certainly a 
new staff would not solve all of the problems, but the Tampa ex-
perience should have made the inadequacies of the old system man-
ifest. 
A survey of the annual reports of the Secretary of War 
for 1898 and 1899 shows a host of changes in minor details which 
reflect the experience of the Spanish-American War, and show the 
preoccupation of most of the people involved with the problems 
encountered. 
As an example of the detail changes, one might take a 
circular published ·by the Adjutant-General's Office on November 
10, 1898. This circular directed that cooks could now be enlist-
cd for the specific job of cooking, or would be paid at a special 
rate. 13 This change represented something that successive 
Commissary-generals had been trying to get through Congress for 
twenty-five years before the War. 
Other examples of detail changes may be found in addi-
tiona to the hospital corps manpower, particularly at the regi-
mental level, provisions for regular sanitary inspections of 
troops in camp, the adoption of a tropical uniform and tropical 
rations. 14 
A more specific note relating to Tampa is struck by the 
Inspector General in discussing field transport for the year of 
1898. He refers to the "revolution N in army methods caused by 
recent tropical experiences, and tho "competency and adaptabili-
ty of officers and men to organize and handle the transportation 
of an army, and the special knowledge required to do it. ,,15 
The Quartermaster-General's Office was aware of the 
changes which had taken place in the field of transportation, and 
a new manual for the use of field quartermasters reflected these 
changes in its organization. It concentrated on the operation 
of quartermaster depots, and the handling of all type of trans-
portation. l6 
The major changes which were to affect the War Depart-
ment were taking shape. The first step in the program of change 
was the resignation of Secretary of ~lar Alger. McKinley had 
been more and more unhappy with Alger's performance at the War 
Department, but had hesitated to ask for his resignat.ion while 
the public clamor over the war was going on. When the Dodge Com-
mission, in effect, cleared Alger, the ",ray was open for his res-
ignation, which was not obtainr,r', however I without a lot of ma-
n euvering on the part of l"lcKir: ley designed to placate the irasci-
ble Alger. 
In July 1899, one of f.icKinley· s men, at the direction of 
the President, made a telephone call to the summer horne of a 
prominent New York la'i<!ycr. When the man answered the phone, he 
was told that tho President wanted him for the position of Secre-
tary of War. Elihu Root, the lawyer, responded with his thanks, 
but said that he Knew nothing of the Army. The reply carne back 
that the President did not want a man who knew about the Army, 
but for a lawyer to direct the administration of the newly-
acquired Spanish islands. Root accepted, and began a long career 
in government service. His first steps at the War Department 
were marked by efficiency, for Root, though ignorant of the Army, 
was a capable administrator. loath the aid of a number of offi-
cers in the War Department, Root bent himself to the task of ad-
ministering the Spanish islands. In doing so, he of necessity 
became familiar with the Army's system of administration, and its 
staff operations. In the course of his studies, he read the re-
port of the Dodge Commission, and discussed its findings with 
General Dodge, a personal friend. The recommendations of the 
commission were reinforced by his reading of Emory Upton's works 
on the military policy of the U. S. They gave Root, as he put 
it, " ••• the detail on which I could base recommendations and 
17 
overcame my ignorance as a civilian." Upton's writings gave 
Root the theory, and Tampa provided the impetus for the changes 
he made. 
Root felt that the permanent assignment to staff duties 
which was then the rule in the Army was inefficient and produc-
tive of petty bureaucrats, more interested in building their own 
little empires of political influence than in operating effi-
ciently. He felt that a permanent general staff, under the con-
trol of a chief of staff, would be the best way for the War De-
partment to operate efficiently. The chief obstacle in his path 
was the Commanding General, Nelson A. Miles. Miles, an old In-
dian fighter, did not want the office of Commanding General abol-
ished, and it was on this point that he and Root crossed swords. 
Miles had an ambition to be President, and the office of Command-
ing General would, he thought, serve as a good spring board. 18 
Root's first attempt to carry out his ideas in 1902 was blocked 
by Miles' opposition and use of his political influence and mil-
itary prest i ge. In fact, Root did not succeed in getting his 
way until after Miles retired. The retirement of Miles in Au-
gust of 1903 left the road for reform open, and only a week af-
ter it became effective, the Act of Congress which began the ex-
istence of the General Staff Corps went into effect. Root's 
was the product of over four years' work in molding opinion on 
the problem. He had worked on prominent editors through 
recommending the works of Upton, which he had reprinted as a 
government document, and on Congress through the annual reports. 
A foreign diplomat once praised the annual report of the Secre-
tary of War during Root's term of service as the best authority 
on military affairs in the world. 
The influences acting on Root were threefold: the work 
of Upton, the recommendations of officers at the War Department 
and Teddy Roosevelt, once he became president, and finally his 
own study of the problem particularly the operations at Ta~n1pa. 
In assessing the amount of influence each of these three 
forces had on Root, no simple solution presents itself. Each 
force did have an effect, and the fact that Root was subjected 
to each force can be proved. But the degree to which a particu-
lar idea influenced this man cannot be determined. The best 
that can be said is that Root was aware of the logistical prob-
lems, and understood what had caused them. His actions in crea-
ting a general staff can be tied to Upton, or to the Spanish War 
veterans, among them Roosevelt, but Tampa also exercised an in-
fluence. 
But Upton's work was by no means the only influence act-
ing on Root. He" ••• could not have done it if it were not 
for the popular interest aroused by the scandals of the Spanish 
War •••• ", according to his official biographer who had the 
opportunity to check his statements with Root. 19 In addition 
to his talks with General Dodge, he also spoke with General 
Horace Porter and Adjutant-General corbin. 20 He also spoke to 
some of the younger . officers of the Army, no doubt including vet-
erans of the Spanish War, during his study of the problems of the 
Army in general. Among these younger officers was 1-1ajor vlilliam 
H. Carter, who had also served under Upton, and who embodied the 
ideas of Upton, as well as his experience in the Spanish War in 
his document entitled »Creation of the American General Staff. n21 
Root, as successor to Alger, received many communications about 
Alger's errors, and in the course of investigating the errors, he 
had to dig into the records of the Spanish War. He could not 
have escaped the influence of the War, and as he began to pre-
pare to act, this influence shaped his method of approach. 
Tampa created a climate of receptivity to the idea of 
change in the Anny system, first in the public mind, and later, 
in the minds of some members of Congress and the military hier-
archy. Superimposed on this climate was Root's personality, and 
the other influences. 22 
What conclusion may be drawn from this examination? At 
best, a limited one. The military logistics of the Tampa opera-
tions had a definite effect on the creation of the General Staff 
of the U. S. Army. However, the degree of this effect cannot be 
measured, and the existence of other known influences makes it 
impossible to establish a direct causal relationship between Tam-
pa and the General Staff. Not all of the errors which occurred 
at Tampa could have been prevented by a general staff, but, as 
Secretary Root put it lithe real object of having an Army is to 
prepare for war, It and the establishment of a general staff gave 
the A.rmy an organized group of planners to do just that. 
The logistical operations at Tampa constitute an almost 
forgotten phase in the military history of America. Yet these 
operations, maligned though they were, perhaps because of being 
lnaligned, exercised a great influence on the course of American 
military history. 
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